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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, new approaches that utilize the one-way cryptographic hash functions
in designing improved network security protocols are investigated. The proposed approaches are
designed to be scalable and easy to implement in modern technology.
The first contribution explores session cookies with emphasis on the threat of session
hijacking attacks resulting from session cookie theft or sniffing. In the proposed scheme, these
cookies are replaced by easily computed authentication credentials using Lamport’s well-known
one-time passwords. The basic idea in this scheme revolves around utilizing sparse caching
units, where authentication credentials pertaining to cookies are stored and fetched once needed,
thereby, mitigating computational overhead generally associated with one-way hash
constructions.
The second and third proposed schemes rely on dividing the one-way hash construction
into a hierarchical two-tier construction. Each tier component is responsible for some aspect of
authentication generated by using two different hash functions. By utilizing different
cryptographic hash functions arranged in two tiers, the hierarchical two-tier protocol (our second
contribution) gives significant performance improvement over previously proposed solutions for
securing Internet cookies. Through indexing authentication credentials by their position within
the hash chain in a multi-dimensional chain, the third contribution achieves improved
performance.
In the fourth proposed scheme, an attempt is made to apply the one-way hash
construction to achieve user and broadcast authentication in wireless sensor networks. Due to
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known energy and memory constraints, the one-way hash scheme is modified to mitigate
computational overhead so it can be easily applied in this particular setting.
The fifth scheme tries to reap the benefits of the sparse cache-supported scheme and the
hierarchical scheme. The resulting hybrid approach achieves efficient performance at the lowest
cost of caching possible.
In the sixth proposal, an authentication scheme tailored for the multi-server single signon (SSO) environment is presented. The scheme utilizes the one-way hash construction in a
Merkle Hash Tree and a hash calendar to avoid impersonation and session hijacking attacks. The
scheme also explores the optimal configuration of the one-way hash chain in this particular
environment.
All the proposed protocols are validated by extensive experimental analyses. These
analyses are obtained by running simulations depicting the many scenarios envisioned.
Additionally, these simulations are supported by relevant analytical models derived by
mathematical formulas taking into consideration the environment under investigation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Our world today is signified by its unprecedented reliance on the Internet in all facets of
life. From online banking and shopping, e-governance, medical recording, military surveillance
to manufacturing and production, we are witnessing a cyber revolution that never once had been
anticipated. Admittedly, this realization does not come without its caveats. One of the major
hurdles that is potentially slowing down this trend and threatening its ascending wave is
represented in the security threats associated with the inherent nature of the Internet. As the
Internet advances, so do the cyber threats, and we see numerous occasions, that take place on a
daily basis, where billions of dollars are lost due to the weakness of Internet security, or lack
thereof.
As an example of the counter-measures deployed to increase cybersecurity, one-way hash
functions have been widely utilized in numerous applications to secure wired and wireless
communication. One-way hash functions, which are based on cryptographic hash functions, are
a practical example of how forth we have come in our battle against cybersecurity threats and the
advancement in the field of cryptography. Modern cryptography has enabled much of our
Internet today and made electronic commerce thrive by helping companies and individual alike
to maintain their privacy and the integrity of their data, when their information is shared from
virtually everywhere distributed environment.
Given the increasing amount of information spread over the Internet, the potential of
information abuse by unlawful entities grows exponentially, thereby, emphasizing the need for
powerful counter-measures to combat such abuse. Cryptography is by far the backbone of such

counter-measures, and its development will continue to evolve as long as threats prevail.
Accordingly, cryptographic hash functions have evolved with this sole purpose in mind.
This dissertation investigates the wide utilization of one-way hash functions and presents
schemes that are hoped to increase their efficiency. The contributions introduced herein utilize
one-way hash functions in a variety of ways, but they all share a quest for achieving better
performance with the least amount of resources consumed.
1.1

One-way Hashing

One-way hashing is a common practice within cryptographic approaches used today.
Hashing is a widely utilized technique in cryptography in which typical algorithms are deployed
to encode information quickly. Typically, a “hash value” is achieved when these algorithms are
applied to strings of text creating a “digital fingerprint” of the message. The digital fingerprint is
expected to be identifiable by the respective entities who have access to the hash function used to
create the hash value. One of the main benefits of hashing is that it enables us to know if the
transmitted message/data has been altered from its original form or not. Once received, the
hashed value is checked by the receiving entity using the agreed upon hash function primitives,
and if the message conforms to the expected results it is accepted. Otherwise, the message might
have been altered from its original form, and, thus, should be questionable.
The use of hashing in cryptography is attractive for a variety of reasons. One important
aspect of hashing revolves around the fact that the hashing algorithm generates a fixed length
string to any piece of data to which the hashing algorithm is applied. Another feature that is
worthy of noting here is that hashing is not analogous to encrypting. The two distinctive features
that make hashing different from encryption have to do with one-wayness and the resulting
message. Whereas encryption is a two-way process where data is transformed to a cipher-text
2

that is decoded at the destination site, hashing is a one-way operation that converts data into a
compressed message digest that does not get decoded, but, rather the message digest is checked
for integrity. Message integrity is the other distinctive feature making hashing different from
encryption. One of the main goals of hashing is to check the integrity of the message between the
communicating nodes. With hashing, we want to make sure the message is not altered from its
original form during any stage of communication.
Examples of applications that utilize hashing as a backbone solution for their designs are
vast but just to name a few, here is a list of applications:
1.

Digital Signatures: were one of earliest applications of hash functions. Most digital
algorithm schemes verify the authenticity of the message to be signed by utilizing hash
functions. In 1978, Rabin in [1] introduced the idea using hash functions in the digital
signature schemes. The idea is basically is to sign a hashed value of a piece of data M
instead of signing this piece of data directly. The benefit from this technique is twofold. First, instead of directly signing a large set of data with a public key incurring
extraneous computational overhead, hashing the data to produce a smaller sized
message is much more efficient. The second reason is as we mentioned above is that
hashing ensures the integrity of the message.

2.

Password hashing: Previously, storing passwords in plain text was a common procedure
utilized by many service providers. Getting a hold of the passwords file stored in clear
text can lead to compromising the privacy of all clients whose passwords are stored in
the password file. Here, hashing techniques have been proven useful to overcome this
problem. Instead of storing the password in plaintext in the service provider’s database,
a hashed value of the password is stored. Each time the client tries to access a service
3

using their password, the password is hashed, and the hash digest is checked against the
stored hash value. Unless they do not match, the client is granted access.
3.

Identity based encryption: hashing has also been beneficial for identity based
encryption. Like digital signatures, users’ IDs can be large and incur high
computational overhead to be encrypted, and also require to be handled privately. The
use of hashing technique can help provide privacy as well as achieve efficient
encryption.

4.

Hash trees: in this approach, the one-way hash functions are used in a binary tree to
minimize the cost of authentication. The one-way hash functions are applied to data so
that their sources can be verified via the use of the root hash and authentication path
information.

5.

Hash calendar: a special type of hash tree in which one-way hash functions are applied
to conceal time since a special point in the past.

6.

Message authentication code: this approach commonly known as MAC is used to
protect a message’s authenticity and integrity. The hashing technique is central to this
approach. A message authentication code is a keyed hash function, where input to the
hash function is a message as well as a key. Both inputs are subjected to the hash
function and the receiver can verify, given that he has the key, both the authenticity of
the messages and its integrity.

Given these great properties of hash functions, their application is endless and their
versatility makes them a top choice for many developers for encryption and authentication
purposes. Areas where hashing is utilized are vast, but just to name a few we take for instance
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(e.g. wireless sensor networks [2], [3], [4], [5], smart card based authentication schemes [6], [7]
and banking authentication schemes [8], [9]). This dissertation presents an investigation of a few
applications of the one-way hashing techniques and proposes several solutions to try to optimize
their configurations to achieve better performance. By introducing new and innovative solutions
to overcome some of the inherent problems in typical hashing procedures, the main objective is
to make hashing much more suitable for applications with limited recourses.
1.2

Problem Statement

Many web sites encrypt the user’s password and perform robust authentication using SSL
based encryption during the initial login only, but do not apply the same level of costly HTTPS
protection in further transactions. Web servers rely on session cookies saved locally at the client
side to perform authentication after the initial login. Among the information stored in these
cookies is a shared hashed secret, which is used as a proof that the user has been successfully
authenticated at the initial login. As these cookies are transmitted over a wireless link using the
unsecure HTTP protocol, the communication between the user and the web server is vulnerable
to session cookie hijacking. An attacker could take over a user's account by sniffing out the
transmitted HTTP cookies. By hijacking session cookies, it becomes possible for the attacker to
impersonate the victim and interact with the web site without proper authorization. Admittedly,
despite the advancement of security measures to combat such attacks, today’s Internet is much
more prone to security breaches especially with the wide utilization of handheld and mobile
devices.
A similar threat is seen in the context of wireless sensor networks where tiny sensor
networks cooperate to gain information of interest to the network administration. Two of the
major shortcomings of today’s WSN are the scarcity of energy and memory resources. These
5

shortcomings make it difficult to devise security measures that suit them while at the same time
provide robust and effective protection. To protect communication in WSNs, solutions based on
public-key have been proposed. However, the aforementioned shortcomings make such solutions
impractical. Alternatively, solutions based on the keyed-hash chains have been proposed.
One way to secure the connection in both scenarios is utilize hashing techniques. In the
first scenario, the session cookies can be, as suggested in [10], substituted by easily computed
one-way credentials to achieve better handling of cookies and mitigating the possibility of them
being sniffed out resulting in a potential hijacking of a user’s session. In the WSN context, the
authentication of wireless sensor networks and users is a two way process. To secure this two
way process between a user(s) and WSN sensor nodes, keyed-hash chains can be used to
generate verifiable authentication tokens in both sides.
The major difficulty with the one-way hash technique revolves around the fact that the
efficient use of the chain requires an accurate estimation of the number of transactions expected
during the lifetime of the session.

If the number of transactions is overestimated, the

authentication in the early stages will suffer from an unjustified large computational overhead. If
the number of transactions is underestimated, there will be the undesirable synchronization
overhead of establishing a new secret and a new number for the remaining transactions. The
shortcoming is detrimental for any context, but is more pronounced and risky if the devices
handling communication are of limited resources.
Like WSN’s, the context of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has benefitted from
the one-way hash functions advantages. Namely, several researchers have proposed employing
one-way hash functions in authentication schemes. However, due to scalability issues, using oneway hash functions in their standard format can be challenging. Therefore, it can be helpful to
6

consider Merkle Hash Trees to reduce the computational overhead associated with straight
forward implementation of one-way hash functions.
A different yet important application of one-way hash functions for authentication is their
application in multi-server environments. With the wide spread of the Internet, users usually
have several sets of passwords and identities to access different services online. In fact,
according to a recent survey about users’ password habits among American customers, 61% of
people use a single password to access multiple websites and 54% of users have 5 passwords or
less [11]. This reality increases the chances for passwords being forgotten and/or results in users
choosing easy to remember uncomplicated passwords. For that reason, many applications are
now providing opportunities for users to use a single identity to access a variety of services (i.e.
Single Sign-On SSO). One-way hash functions are typically involved in the authentication of
SSO. The challenge here is different. Many of the SSO environments suffer from weaknesses
pertaining to the communication channel between communication nodes. More specifically, the
fact that this channel is uni-directional, thereby lacking mutual authentication, necessitate
looking for more novel technique to convert this channel into a bi-directional one to guarantee
stronger authentication.
1.3

Contributions

In this dissertation, we investigate the possibility of optimizing the one-way hash
constructions to achieve better handling of session cookies as well as user and broadcast
authentication in WSNs. In addition, we investigate the utilization of hash calendars and Merkle
hash trees to improve the authentication of Single Sign-On environments and radio frequency
identification schemes in toll/traffic management. Therefore, seven solutions in which one-way
hash functions are the core of authentication are presented. Although employed differently in
7

each of these solutions to fit each individual environment, one-way hash functions have proven
useful.
In the first contribution [12], we propose a solution geared towards session hijacking in
the general context and mobile devices in particular. We evaluate the use of sparse caching
techniques to reduce the overhead of one-way hash-chain authentication. Sparse cache schemes
with uniform spacing, non-uniform spacing and geometric spacing are designed and analyzed. A
Weighted Overhead formula is used to obtain insight into the suitable cache size for different
classes of mobile devices. Additionally, the scheme is evaluated from an energy consumption
perspective. We show that sparse caching can also be effective in the case of uncertainty in the
number of transactions per user session. Our extensive performance tests have shown significant
improvement achieved by the sparse caching schemes.
In the second contribution [13], we try to lower the computational overhead of OHC by
dividing the one-way hash chain to multiple smaller hash chains. In doing so, we present a twotier one-way hash chain (TTOHC) protocol to secure cookie-based Internet transactions. By
utilizing different cryptographic hash functions arranged in two tiers, our hierarchical TTOHC
protocol gives significant performance improvement over previously proposed solutions for
securing Internet cookies. This solution also succeeds in lowering the computational overhead
significantly, if compared to the straight forward implementation of the one-way hash chain
protocol.
Another area of interest to this dissertation is the collaborative computing environment
and social networking. Collaborative computing is a relatively new computing paradigm whose
success is contingent upon the success of the means used to facilitate it. Similar session hijacking
threats do actually exist for collaborative networking, and, therefore, in the third contribution
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[14] we design a protocol which mitigates the risks by adopting a position-indexed hashing
scheme. Similar to the TTOHC protocol, this protocol utilizes multi-dimensional one-way
hashing, but benefits from the idea of position-indexed hashing. The idea basically uses the
position of the hashing operation within the chain as an additional argument in the hashing
function input adding rigor and complexity to the hashed value. We also run evaluative
experiments to verify the benefits of the proposed protocol, and the results indicate the
superiority of the proposed technique over the straight-forwardly configured hashing protocol.
An analytical model to compute the optimal lengths of the chains is presented.
In the fourth contribution [15], we explore the possibility of applying the one-way hash
function protocol to the user and broadcast authentication of wireless sensor networks. In order
to do so, and to make the one-way hash protocol more attractive for this context, where energy
and memory of wireless sensor networks are scarce as they are, we design a mini one-way hash
chain protocol that is computationally efficient, thereby preserving the memory and energy of
WSN nodes.
The fifth contribution [16] examines the potential benefits of a cache supported hybrid
two-dimensional one-way hash construction to handle social networks’ user sessions
authentication in collaborative applications. The proposed scheme is based on utilizing twodimensional OHC chains equipped with sparse caching capabilities to carry out authentication
during users’ social networks sessions.
The sixth contribution focuses on the context of mutli-server environments. In particular,
a keyless signature scheme to handle single sign-on authentication is proposed. The proposed
solution attempts to mitigate impersonation attacks commonly experienced in such environment.
Merkle hash trees and hash calendars are employed to generate session keys without completely
9

relying on public/private keys to achieve authentication. In doing so, the proposed scheme
provides bi-directional authentication.
The final contribution [17] targets the radio frequency identification systems utilized in
toll/traffic management environments. To address authentication in this setting, a scheme based
Merkle hash trees is proposed. The main benefit of MHTs is its scalability compared to
traditional schemes. Specifically, we try to improve traditional MHTs by a simple division
mechanism where MHTs are split into smaller ones with the premise of improving efficiency.
1.4

Dissertation Organization

The dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter Two, we survey and discuss the
relevant literature. In Chapter Three, we introduce our first contribution where we utilize the
concept of sparse caching to enhance the security of cookie-based sessions in mobile devices.
We demonstrate the main benefits of the proposed solution by presenting the results of our
evaluation experiments. In Chapter Four, we present the second contribution, the two-tier oneway hash chain protocol, along with the experiments conducted to measure its benefits. In
Chapter Five, we investigate the idea of position-indexed hashing and its potential improvement
of one-way hash chains constructions. The investigation is supported by an analytical model and
evaluative experiments. In Chapter Six, we propose ideas to reduce the computational overhead
of one-way hash chains to appropriate it in the context of wireless sensor networks. Chapter
Seven presents the next contribution where a cache supported hybrid two-dimensional one-way
hash construction scheme is employed to authenticate users’ session in collaborative and social
networks environments. The scheme is evaluated mathematically to determine the cost of
authentication and develop a quartic equation to check the optimal configuration of the two
dimensions. We also evaluate the hybrid scheme with simulation experiments of different
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configurations and scenarios. In Chapter Eight, we discuss the context of multi-server networks
where single sign-on solutions are employed to provide a more convenient Internet experience. A
combination of hash calendars and Merkle hash trees is devised to produce a keyless signature to
achieve an updated and bi-directional authentication in this setting. Like the previous chapters,
Chapter eight presents the evaluation and simulations experiments results. Chapter Nine
introduces the tree-based authentication scheme for a cloud based toll/traffic RFID systems and
the relevant evaluation experiments. Finally, Chapter Ten concludes the dissertation and draws
directions for future research in the area of one-way hash chain authentication.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In this chapter, a review of the relevant literature is surveyed to try to bring into
prominence the direction to which research in this area is heading, and situate the current
research within the larger paradigm of cryptography and authentication. First, we present the
literature pertaining to the session cookies illustrating how they evolved. We then introduce onehashing techniques and their application. The main objective of this chapter is to highlight the
great potential of the one-way hashing schemes which made them applicable in many scenarios
and contexts, and to review the work in the literature related to each of our proposed schemes.
2.1

Introduction

The past few years have witnessed an exponential growth in the use of smartphones and
tablets to gain wireless access to the Internet. This growth has been accompanied by a similar
growth in cyber attacks over wireless links to steal session cookies and hijack private users’
accounts. In a 2010 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [18], broken
authentication and session management attacks were identified among the top ten list along with
injection, cross-site scripting and cross-site forgery attacks. In their 2013 Release, OWASP still
lists these attacks, which lead to session hijacking, among the top 10 security threats of the
Internet [19]. Additionally, the broken authentication and session management attacks have
moved up in prevalence to be second in the list. Many tools have been shown to aid in such
attacks for empirical purposes. For example, the Android application FaceNiff [20] makes it easy
to hijack other people's sessions using an Android smartphone with root access. The application
is claimed to work over any private Wi-Fi network using any of the common protocols, including
WEP, WPA-PSK, WPA2-PSK, or no security at all. FaceNiff can be used to intercept web
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session profiles and easily hijack sessions for Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Amazon, MySpace,
Nasza-Klasa, blogger, etc. The only exception that disables FaceNiff is when the session is
protected by EAP or SSL. In a similar vein, Firesheep [21], an extension for Firefox, clearly
revealed that many sites fail to protect users against session hijacking attacks. To alert users of
these vulnerabilities, a Firefox plug-in extension has been developed in [22] which notifies users
if the server they are visiting is susceptible to cookie hijacking. This extension only gives
warning for users to avoid risky web sessions but does not provide protection.
Wireless networks have more types of security threats and are much more prone to
malicious attacks than wired networks. Serious security vulnerabilities exist in all types of
wireless networks including 802.11 wireless LANs, wireless ad hoc networks, multihop wireless
mesh networks, and wireless sensor networks [23], [24], [25], [26]. Of particular interest to the
current research is the security threat of hijacking user’ private sessions over wireless links. This
threat is increasingly on the rise due to two reasons: i) the worldwide proliferation of
smartphones, tablets and other handheld mobile devices as a primary tool for Internet access and
ii) the increasing use of HTTP cookies by web applications to speed up responses to users and
offer a better web experience that is more personalized and richer in interactivity. Since cookies
are stored on the client’s machine, they are one of the most popular means available to web
developers to create better web applications without requiring significant server resources.
Session cookies are being increasingly used for many purposes including session and transaction
authentication, tracking of shopping cart contents, identification of user's preferences, and
tracking browsing behavior. Cookies usually exist as plain text on the client machine and can be
tampered with by attackers if they succeed to compromise this machine.
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The best way to overcome the issue of session hijacking is to use HTTPS (i.e., HTTP
over SSL or TLS) throughout the lifetime of the session. This guarantees a fully secure session
by encrypting users’ login information and securing all transactions between login and logout.
However, due to the costly nature of this approach, many developers use HTTPS only in the
login and initial authentication then revert to the approach of using cookies stored locally at the
client’s side to carry out authentication throughout the remainder of the session. Session cookies
store information about the identity of the client and a shared secret which indicates that the user
has been authenticated in the initial login. Since these cookies are transmitted over unsecure
links using the unsecure HTTP protocol, they are susceptible to malicious attacks which can sniff
out session cookies and, consequently, take over a client’s identity and allow the attacker to gain
the same level of access over the web application that the original user has.
The use of cookies as a cheaper alternative to the wide utilization of the secure HTTPS
protocol has been also attractive to many collaborative websites and social media networks. One
cannot deny the fact that the unprotected nature of cookies can compromise the collaborative
environment. Evidently, the availability of social networks and collaboration websites where
access to the website is extended to long durations has made this issue even more pressing.
Although using a secure protocol (e.g. HTTPS) to connect to the web provides higher levels of
security, it is not always applied by many web servers and is replaced by cookie protection. The
nature of cookies as plain text stored at the client’s side makes it not too complicated for an
adversary to hack these cookies and steal the Internet session leading to a compromise in the
users’ overall Internet experience.
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2.2

Securing Session Cookies

As mentioned above the most secure way to handle an internet session is to carry out this
session using either The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol [27] and its successor, the
Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS) [28], or the Secure-Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTPS) [29]. The encryption in the SSL/TLS protocol is achieved via utilizing asymmetric
cryptography allowing applications between client-server to communicate without worrying
about eavesdropping and tampering. The communication via the SSL/TLS protocol is carried out
using an encrypted, secure channel that is established by using authentication certificates. Note
that these authentication certificates can be mutually exchanged, thereby enabling mutual
authentication between the server and clients for maximum protection. The HTTPS, on the other
hand, is not considered a protocol by itself, but it achieves its security by working on top of
SSL/TLS. However, since the SSL/TLS is the backbone encryption mechanism used in HTTPS,
the same can be said about the HTTPS.
The security of the SSL/TLS protocols has resulted in their wide utilization in many
applications as they are well-suited for finance, e-business, healthcare etc. However, these
advantages do not come without their prices. One of the major drawbacks of the secure SSL/TLS
and HTTPS protocols preventing their wide utilization in Internet is their demands for
computational resources. Given the fact that they rely on authentication certificates to achieve
their encryption and decryption, the computation required to transmit the certificate is an
additional burden both on the client and the server sides. Furthermore, SSL incurs additional
costs which many companies prefer to spare for other expenses. According to [30], web servers
that employ SSL incur performance penalty that ranges from a factor 3.4 to 9 compared to web
servers not utilizing SSL. For these reasons many websites prefer to use SSL/TLS based
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communication for the initial login stages, and then resort to the less expensive, both
computationally and economically, stateless internet protocol HTTP. In order to keep state and
avoid the need for the user to identify himself to websites every time he logs in to a web site, we
revert to cookies as carriers of users’ identity information. Imagine having to introduce yourself
every time you meet someone. While this is not pertinent in real life, cookies are made with this
imagination in mind. Unlike humans, this reality can pose serious threats to the Internet
experience as these identifiers can be accessed and unlawfully exploited, thus, leading to attacks
such as session hijacking.
2.3

What Are Cookies?

Cookies were originally invented to help facilitate the online e-commerce industry. The
authors of [31] identify cookies as metadata that pertains to a pair of name/value information sent
by an HTTP server to a user agent. Whenever the user agent tries to access URL that requires
identification in the HTTP server, the cookies are used as identifiers. According to [32], cookies
are the piece of information that the server and client pass back and forth. In addition, [32]
indicates that the amount of information, whose content is at the discretion of the server, tends to
be usually small. Although simply examining a cookie’s value will not reveal what the cookie is
for, or what the value represents as [32] points out, information about the user can still leak out
exposing privacy and potentially infringing the security of the internet experience. This is evident
in the mechanism with which the HTTP cookies operate. As [32] further explains, “a cooperating
client returns the cookie information verbatim in a Cookie header, one of its request headers, each
time it makes a new request to the same server”. Thus, unless told by the server that the cookie is
changed, the client will keep the previous cookie unchanged. Note that changing the cookie
automatically supersedes the previous cookie [31]
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Cookies can be of many types and flavors and can serve a variety of purposes. For
example, there are session cookies, first party cookies, persistent cookies, secure cookies, and
several more. Our main concern in this research is session cookies or more precisely, persistent
cookies, and, thus, will be highlighted. As the name suggests, session cookies are mainly used to
identify a user for a particular Internet session. One of the main features of sessions cookies is that
they are subject to an expiration period or valid for a certain amount of time. First designed by
[33] to keep state of the user in online shopping scenarios, session cookies are set up to have an
end point set forth by the server. This end point, however, can be extended, as a convenient
feature, to alleviate the need of users to enter their login credentials each time they log in, thereby
resulting in a higher possibilities of them being sniffed out and exploited.
2.4

Current Practices

The security measures currently utilized to avoid the hijacking of session cookies are
lacking both in depth and dearth. In fact, the authors of [34] point out that the use of cookies in
web sessions has not evolved much since its first days indicating that they are susceptible to
attacks such as eavesdropping. The fact that web sessions utilizes static tokens sent over a
plaintext channel makes it possible for an eavesdropper to possibly take over the session [34].
This threat is on the rise due to the wide utilization of wireless networks. On the threat caused by
wireless connection, the authors of [34] highlight that users freely connect to the wireless base
stations and then are asked for login credentials of the web sites they are trying to access,
allowing wireless operators to manage per-user password access-control. They further explain
that wireless operators should not be doing this practice and limiting password exposure to that
pertaining to the Wi-Fi service they are providing.
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Several solutions have been proposed to address the problem of session cookie hijacking
in wired and wireless networks. Liu et al. [35] proposed a secure cookie protocol for ensuring
integrity of each transmitted cookie by applying HMAC on the concatenation (username |
expiration time | data | session key). Their fundamental assumption, however, is that their secure
cookie protocol would either encrypt the data using a session key or run on top of SSL. As
mentioned above, the use of HTTPS throughout the internet session is not only computationally
inadequate due to the large computation associated with key generation and handling, it is also
very costly. Many websites have different servers that they rely on, and to provide HTTPS on
their servers would incur extraneous costs that might be unnecessary.
Given that SSL is not always optimal for all applications, Adida [34] proposed a
technique called SessionLock as an alternative to the wide utilization of SSL. Essentially,
SessionLock works in two stages: the first sage is done using a secure connection on top of SSL
and involves establishing a session key, and the second stage is where the remainder of the
session is carried out and it is run on HTTP. Using HMAC as a cryptographic function, a shared
session secret is generated and used to encrypt each subsequent request from the client to the
server. While this solution offers potential in solving session hijacking especially, it is not robust
against different types of attacks especially active attackers who can amend or even steal the
session key and use it unlawfully. In HMAC based techniques, the compromise of the shared key
compromises the whole session as all future values of HMAC can be easily calculated.
Moreover, techniques such as URL re-writing and URL fragmentation, which are essential in the
SessionLock solution, might not be suitable for different applications.
Another direction of research suggests the use of an external proxy where authentication
and sensitive information management are carried out completely at the proxy or some other
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external device (e.g. a user’s cell phone) [36],[37]. However, this solution’s implementation can
pose difficulties as it might not be optimal in all situations. Specifically, if a user does not have
access to the proxy for any reason or in case the external device is not available at the time the
service is desired (e.g., cellphone battery is dead, no coverage...etc.), he will not be able to use
the service provided by the web application.
2.5

New Direction

We have seen in the previous section that for the most part current practices to secure
session cookies are either based on the wide utilization of SSL/TLS based connection, or on
solutions that are not as rigorous. Alternatively, a possible candidate to address the problem of
session hijacking caused by the lacking security of Internet cookies is the Lamport’s well-known
one-way hash chain technique for one-time passwords [38] which was later formulated by Haller
to the S/Key standard [39]. Lamport’s ideas were very attractive to many researchers. For
example, the attack-resilient security architecture ARSA [40], proposed for multihop wireless
mesh networks, uses a hierarchical one-way hash chain to authenticate beacons transmitted by
mesh routers. The Ariadne secure on-demand Adhoc network routing protocol [41] uses hash
chains in its Route Discovery phase and in later phases to thwart the effects of routing
misbehavior. The SEAD protocol [42] proposed for Adhoc networks also uses a one-way hash
chain for authenticating important routing information such as the routing metric and the
sequence number. This prevents any malicious nodes from falsely advertising a better route or
tampering with the critical routing information contained in the packet that it received from the
source.
Several proposals have tried to address the problem of session cookies’ exploitation by
adopting schemes which rely on Lamport’s one-way passwords. For instance, [43] proposed a
19

solution that targets the read-only property of the session cookies in the website’s databases.
They achieve their protection by leveraging the read property so that it becomes hard for an
attacker to correctly guess the cookie value. Conceptually, they suggest including an iterated
hashed value of the user’s password and its pre-image in the session cookies. These two values
are compared each time a communication between the server and client is desired. To strengthen
the cookies, they add a salt value which they claim makes it even harder for an adversary to
detect the users’ private information.
We, therefore, address the potential benefits of applying the one-way hash chain as a
technique to secure session cookies. Our objective is to propose schemes which not only
preserve the cryptographic strength of one-way hash chains, but also use it in a computationally
efficient manner. Unlike HMAC based schemes discussed above, using the one-way hash chains
to secure cookies minimizes the chances of them being sniffed out and abused for unlawful
utilization by entities other than the respective parties.
The one-way hash chain technique has been recently used to protect against cookie
hijacking in wireless networks. The One-Time-Cookies (OTC) protocol proposed in [10] is a
straightforward implementation of Lamport’s hash chain technique for one-time passwords. The
authors implemented OTC as a plug-in for Firefox and Firefox for mobile browsers. OTC uses a
hash chain construction to generate a sequence of values that can be used as one-time
authentication tokens. These tokens, once verified by the web application, cannot be reused due
to the pre-image resistance property of cryptographic hash functions. The Rolling Code protocol
proposed in [44] is an attempt to reduce the computational overhead of the OTC protocol for
mobile devices with constrained memory. The protocol replaces the hash chain performed by
OTC in each transaction by two hash operations: one to update and randomize the value of a
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variable d = hash(d) and the other to produce a one-time authentication token by applying a hash
function on the Exclusive-OR of a secret seed and the new value of d. In essence the protocol is
much like the rolling code technology used to prevent perpetrators from recording a code and
replaying it to open a garage door. The Rolling code protocol is less robust than the one-way
hash chain approach (e.g., the OTC protocol) but is lightweight and more suitable for mobile
phones and PDA’s. Although the seed is guaranteed to be fresh during each iteration due to the
monotonic function used to increase the value of d, there is a high risk of discovering this value
and consequently compromising the internet session.
2.6

The One-way Hash Chain Model

We first present the notations for the one-way hash chain technique that we will use in
this dissertation. We will refer to this hash chain technique as the HACH technique, which can
be described as follows:
HACH uses an initial secret s which is the seed of the hash chain. We apply a
cryptographic hash function H() successively to obtain the following values
V0
V1
V2
…
Vj
…
VN

=s
= H(V0) = H1(s)
= H(V1) = H2(s)
= H(Vj-1) = Hj(s)
= H(VN-1) = HN(s)
Due to the pre-image resistance property of the hash function (e.g., SHA-1), the values Vi

are distinct and can therefore be used to represent one-time authentication tokens in successive
user transactions after the initial login, i.e., the value of the appropriate V token is stored in the
session cookie transmitted by the client to the server in each transaction. To properly use the
one-way hash chain, these values must be transmitted in reverse order. In the first transaction
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after login, the client browser transmits the value VN. Similarly, the client transmits VN-1 in the
second transaction and VN-i+1 in the ith transaction.
During the initial HTTPS authentication, a shared secret value s and a value chain length
N representing the number of transactions are exchanged between the client and the server. After
the initial login, the costly HTTPS protocol is replaced by HTTP and authentication is done by
sending the one-time authentication tokens in the session cookies. Upon receiving the value of an
authentication token, the server computes a similar value based on the values of N and s, and
accepts the transaction if the received value matches the computed value.
The variable N is the chain length and represents an upper bound on the number of
transactions that can be handled by the above hash chain. One difficulty with the HACH
technique is that the efficient use of the chain requires an accurate estimation of the value of N,
i.e., the number of transactions expected during the lifetime of the session. If the number of
transactions is overestimated, the authentication in the early steps will suffer from an unjustified
large computational overhead. If the number of transactions is underestimated, there will be the
undesirable synchronization overhead of establishing a new secret and a new number for the
remaining transactions. For our initial presentation of the sparse caching technique, we will
assume that the number of transactions in a session, N, is accurately known. Later in the
dissertation, we will show how the sparse caching technique can be used to effectively deal with
the case when the value of N is not accurately known.
We will use the number of hash operations executed per transaction as the metric to
evaluate the execution overhead of the process of verifying this transaction using the
authentication token transmitted by the client. We denote this metric for the ith transaction by
HCosti. Smaller values of this metric indicate faster speeds for the authentication process. The
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total cost of the entire session is the sum of the costs of the N transactions and is denoted by
TotalHCost.
In its most basic format, the 1st transaction in the HACH protocol computes HN(s) and has
a cost HCost1 = N. In general, the ith transaction computes HN-i+1(s) and has a cost HCosti = Ni+1. We have
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1(𝑁 − 𝑖 + 1) =

𝑁(𝑁+1)

( 2.1 )

2

The maximum and average value of the transaction execution overhead are given by
HCostmax = N
HCostavg = (N+1)/2
It is important to stress that the authentication tokens are generated by successive hashing
from V0 to XN but are exposed (i.e., presented as authentication tokens) from VN to V0. The
reverse presentation of the values of the hash sequence is a fundamental feature that must be
enforced in order to attain the good security properties of one-way hash chains. Exposing
(presenting) the hash sequence values in the same forward order in which they are generated
makes the scheme much less secure because if one hash value is compromised, the attacker can
compute all the hash values that will be used in the future.
The HACH protocol in the above description is the backbone of our solutions. In the four
proposed schemes, we try to optimize the HACH by reducing its computational overhead to suit
different scenarios and contexts. The different techniques utilized try to benefit as much as
possible from the advantages of the HACH protocol maintaining its cryptographic strength,
while at the same time minimizing the drawback inherently associated with its construction.
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2.7

User and Broadcast Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks

Another area of interest that we investigated in this dissertation is user and broadcast
authentication in wireless sensor networks. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a collection of
tiny sensor nodes that work collaboratively to gather information. Typical shortcomings of
wireless sensor nodes include their limited storage and power resources. Versatile as they are,
WSNs have gained acceptance and are being widely used in various arenas such as military
sensing and tracking, traffic monitoring, industrial quality control, medical monitoring, etc. With
the fast rate of acceptance of such networks, they are expected to grow both in capacities and
capabilities.
One of the important issues slowing down this growth in deployment lies in their security
vulnerability. Attacks on WSNs can be as easy as intercepting messages, falsifying data and
impersonating users to gain access. Such attacks can only be avoided by exercising robust and
effective security measures that prevent unlawful access of unauthorized entities. The fact that
sensor nodes in WSNs are not well-endowed in terms of memory and energy makes it necessary
for solutions addressing such attacks to be lightweight, efficient and memory/energy preserving.
Solutions proposed to address the problem of security issues in WSNs are still work in
progress. Specifically, authenticating the data broadcast and users over a WSN is very crucial.
Researchers such as [45], [46], [47] suggest using public-key based solution. However, with
limited energy and memory capabilities, such solutions can pose difficulties in deployment due
to high cost of calculating public keys. Alternatively, solutions based on the keyed-hash chains
have been proposed [48], [49]. However, if used in the basic configuration where a shared key is
hashed with no limits on the length of keyed-hash chain, two major problems arise. Similar to
session cookies security issues discussed above, the shared key in the WSN can be compromised,
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and, hence, data might be at risk putting the whole WSN in danger. Second, the length of the
keyed-hashed chain can grow considerably leading to an unjustified overhead that cannot be
handled by a sensor node with limited memory and energy. In this dissertation, we investigate
these two problems and try to address them by adapting the HACH protocol to achieve broadcast
and user authentication for WSNs.
2.8

Authentication in Single Sign-On Environments

Due to the proliferation of social networking, cloud computing and the Internet of things,
Single Sign-On schemes are now becoming more popular. Social networking giants such
Facebook, Google Twitter and several others are providing SSO services to the public. Protocols
utilizing Browser-based Single Sign-On (SSO) provide convenience and security for users and
service providers alike. By employing SSO protocols, users are relieved the burden of having to
possess multiple sets of IDs and passwords for different web services they wish to use. Similarly,
service providers are relieved the burden of a variety of login-related tasks such as clients
contacting them for stolen passwords, recovering of forgotten passwords, revocation of possibly
compromised passwords etc. As such, by substituting multiple identities corresponding to
multiple service providers connected via a central identity provider with a single identity, SSO
protocols are promising a more secure Internet experience, especially given that clients typically
use easy to remember weak passwords and usually use the same passwords to access different
applications.
An SSO authentication scheme rely on three main components: the users wishing to be
granted access to certain services, the service provider SP (also known as the relying party) and
the Identity Provider (IdP) who delegates identity assertions to the SP. Several researchers have
discovered critical security concerns related to the communication between these three
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components (e.g. [50], [51] ). In an extensive analysis of SSO, the authors of [50] detected
several serious logic flaws in commonly deployed SSO systems and RP’s. Similarly, the authors
of [51] have identified flaws in two of the commonly utilized SSO frameworks, namely, SAML
SSO and OpenID that lead to hijacking a user’s authentication attempt and accessing resources
without the user’s consent. Such impersonation attacks can be detrimental to the utilization of
SSO schemes, as they can lead to exposing of critical information about the users thereby
threatening their privacy.
SSO authentication schemes generally aim to provide the users with the convenience of
singing in to one portal and gaining access to several services. Therefore, they inherent many of
the password related features present in common authentication systems such as the Lamport
authentication protocol [38]. After successful login, session authentication is typically achieved
via either a secure channel such an SSL or in a cookie supported HTTP connection. While they
have been relatively successful in securing communication in conventional computing
environments, they fell short in the context of SSO due to their inability to provide robustness
and rigor in authentication required for this setting.
Therefore, researchers have tried to come with solutions particularly designed to suit the
SSO environment. The majority of schemes designed to suit SSO fall within two main
categories: hash-based authentication schemes and public-key based authentication schemes.
Among the early attempts to design a hash-based authentication architecture for SSO is reported
in [52] who proposed an authentication protocol that guarantees users’ anonymity by employing
a combination of public key and session token infrastructure. However, this scheme was shown
to have vulnerabilities due to the public nature of the session token, thereby leading to
impersonation and identity disclosure attacks as shown in [53]. The authors of [53], alternatively,
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proposed utilizing timestamping to improve the strength of the session key-based approach.
Yang et al. in [54] identified a weakness in the previous protocol resulting in the possibility of
the service providers getting a hold of the clients session ID, and they proposed an improvement
which relies on public-key cryptographic infrastructure. However, as they point out, their scheme
is prone to DoS attacks. These three schemes all rely on the use of smart cards as an additional
authentication factor. Although there followed several improvements on the smart card solutions
(e.g. [55], [56], [57] [58]), relying on a central agency to issue smart card credentials for the
whole network can be problematic as it increases single point of failure which can be detrimental
to the whole scheme.
Another group of SSO authentication protocols that have gained popularity and became
widely adopted in today’s SSO environments is the Security Assertion Markup Language SAML
[59], [60], and the OpenID Project [61]. One of the essential reasons why the two SSO
authentication mechanisms have gain popularity can be attributed to the fact that both are
browser-based solutions. In other words, unlike the schemes discussed earlier which require
additional resources such as a smart card issuing entity, the SAML and the OpenID simply
require a standard web browser as a user agent. The SAML authentication protocol relies on sets
of public and private keys for verification, whereas the OpenID depends on session cookies as a
verification mechanisms. However, both schemers were found to have critical vulnerabilities
pertaining to the logic with which they are designed. In particular, the fact that both are unidirectional and the possibility of using multiple SSL connections render them susceptible to
attacks such as impersonation and hijacking attacks. In this dissertation, we propose an
authentication protocol that is bi-directional and guarantees the recentness of authentication

27

assertions. Specifically, we utilize the idea of keyless signatures proposed in [62] in conjunction
of Merkle Hash Trees [63] to authenticate communication in the SSO network.
2.9

Authenticating Cloud-based Toll/Traffic RFID Systems

Due to its capacity to wirelessly and remotely identify tagged objects, RFID (Radio
Frequency Identification) technology has long been used in numerous applications to track
assets, enable supply chain management, track commodities in retail stores, payment, security
and access control and many more. Recently, vehicular and traffic management applications
have adopted this technology in road tolls administration and enforcement. Many municipalities
around the world depend on RFID for electronic toll tracking/ payment through devising RFID
tags mounted in the cars or plates of their customers. TransCore, one of the biggest RFID
providers, indicate that over 3.5 million customers travel their electronic tolling systems at
highway speeds and simply pay their tolls using RFID tags or their vehicle license plates [64].
The Express Way Authority in Central Florida, for example, says that in 2013, the number of
transponders used to track their electronic toll operations is estimated at around 530.000 units; a
number that has grown steadily throughout the past 10 years [65]. According to a report by EZPass Group, the number of transponders in their road toll system has more than doubled in less
than ten years from around 13 million in 2005 to more than 26 million transponders 2013 [66].
The RFID technology is moving toward being adopted in more traffic related applications such
as tag registration and number plate tracking. Such applications are promising since they can
solve a lot of traffic issues experienced today such as congestion, car theft, and rental fleet
management; all of which can bring about better utilization of current infrastructures.
As part of its thriving evolution to become a more enabling technology, the RFID
schemes are presenting architectures which benefit from cloud computing to provide more
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resilient and catering solutions for companies. The context of traffic and road toll management is
one of the beneficiary applications of this trend, as managing data that grows exponentially
throughout the years can be very costly and can hinder the future of RFID in traffic management
and application. Therefore, moving to a cloud-assisted traffic management scheme definitely
reduces some of the costs associated with storing and handling vehicles’ information. However,
this movement is not without cost. Authenticating cloud-based RFID schemes is challenging
because such schemes inherent security flaws of both the RFID technology and cloud computing.
The majority of RFID schemes presented in the literature targeting road tolls and traffic
contexts have been concerned with the engineering and conceptual aspects of the issue (e.g. [67],
[68]). However, little research has been conducted to investigate the issue of authentication in
RFID based toll/traffic management systems. This dissertation also tries to address this issue in
addition to the previous ones. In this section, we overview some of the related literature to the
RFID in general.
The authors of [69] stress the importance of authentication in RFID systems. They
indicate that RFID systems are susceptible to security threats due to the fact that they work nonline-of-sight in a contactless fashion, thereby, allowing attackers to remotely and passively
launch attacks without being noticed. The resulting security concerns can be unwanted consumer
tracking, tag forgery and unauthorized access of tags’ memory content. As a result, any RFID
scheme should address this issue. Strong authentication of RFID systems, according to [69], are
efficient in combating such attacks. Many authentication schemes proposed thereafter attempt to
achieve this property. Authentication can be achieved through cryptographic based approaches
such as symmetric block ciphers and one-way hash based schemes. Examples of schemes that
adopt symmetric block ciphers include [70], [71], [72]]. The main drawback of symmetric block
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cipher solutions is the high computational overload associated with the calculation scheme.
Alternatively, solutions based on the one-way hash chain constructions such as [73], [74], [75]
have been proposed. However, with a network of RFID readers and RFID tags as big as the
traffic/ road toll management that can go up to several hundreds of thousands of tags and readers,
these solutions will suffer from a scalability problem. Both symmetric block cipher schemes and
one-way hash chains solutions suffer from this problem, as a linear search is needed in the
database each time the reader tries to identify a tag. This problem is more prominent in the above
described scenario where many readers and tags alike can require access to the database at the
same time; which renders such protocols unsuitable for traffic/ road toll applications.
Schemes based on binary trees have shown benefit in improving the scalability by
reducing the search complexity from O(N) in the linear search schemes to O(logN), where N
represents the number of RFID tags in the network.
The traffic/ road toll scenario presents challenging dimensions in the employment of
RFID schemes. First, the majority of RFID readers in the system are stationary making physical
capture of them far-fetched. However, readers in this context are typically given one chance to
read the RFID tags since RFID-equipped vehicles typically pass through the RFID readers range
only once. Thus, the reading window is limited and readers cannot afford a complex search, such
as the one achieved by a linear search. As stated above, a tree-based solution achieves acceptable
and relatively low complexity searches.
In this dissertation, we introduce a tree-based solution that reinforces the RFID
authentication process by predefining the tree upper bound, thereby, spreading the data of the
RFID system into multiple trees. Our aim from doing so is to reduce the computational overhead
while at the same time improving scalability.
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CHAPTER 3: HASH CHAIN (HACH) WITH SPARSE CACHING
TECHNIQUES
3.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we present and evaluate the use of sparse caching techniques to reduce the
overhead of one-way hash-chain authentication. Sparse cache schemes with uniform spacing,
non-uniform spacing and geometric spacing are designed and analyzed. A Weighted Overhead
formula is used to obtain insight into the suitable cache size for different classes of mobile
devices. Additionally, the scheme is evaluated from an energy consumption perspective. We
show that sparse caching can also be effective in the case of uncertainty in the number of
transactions per user session.
3.2

Sparse Caching: Basic Idea

The main drawback of the HACH protocol, as elaborated in Chapter Two, is the need to
perform the hashing operation N times for the first transaction, N-1 times for the second
transaction, and so on. For large values of N, the Hash Chain (HACH) technique is costly and is
not generally suitable for most mobile devices that have scarce memory resources. In this
chapter, we propose using a sparse caching approach to attain the full level of security of oneway hash chains but at a much reduced computational overhead. An earlier proposal for sparse
caching was given by Gupta et al. [76] as a way to reduce directory memory requirements. The
hallmark of this approach is that a memory block is allocated for each active entry and
invalidated data is discarded as they are no longer needed. Because of this feature, sparse
caching techniques have been appealing in a variety of environments and applications. The
authors of [77], for instance, proposed a method to improve users’ perceived performance in
wireless networks using sparse infrastructure. Also, the authors of [78], [79] suggested using
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sparse caching in multimedia applications. As we describe our proposed solution, we also
introduce several cache spacing configurations that are deployable in different scenarios.
cache[0] = s
cache[1] = H20(s),
cache[2] = H40(s),
cache[3] = H60(s),
cache[4] = H80(s).
The above values can be computed using a simple loop that computes the hash function
80 times. The availability of the above cache values reduces the execution overhead of
transactions considerably. For example, the first transaction can now start by fetching the value
of cache[4] then performing 20 more hashes to obtain H20(H80(s)) = H100(s). The value HCost1
for the first transaction has been reduced from 100 to 20. Basically the sparse caching scheme
has divided the initial hash chain into five mini-chains, each with length 20.
The above example uses sparse caching with uniform (equal) spacing. We will examine
non-uniform spacing later, but we will first formally define the uniform spacing model and
examine its characteristics.
3.2.1

Sparse Caching with Uniform Spacing

This scheme is defined by two parameters, the size of the cache, cache_size, and the
uniform space interval, minichain_len. In the above example, cache_size = 5 and
minichain_len= 20.
The pseudo code to compute the authentication token of the ith transaction is presented
below. Notice that in the ith transaction, the client transmits the value VN-i+1 = HN-i+1(s).
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Authentiaction_Token(i);
k = (N-i) / minichain_len

// integer division

m = N - (k  minichain_len)
VN-i+1 = Hm(cache[k])
Using the uniform sparse caching scheme, the total cost of a session including the cost of
the initial cache setup is given by
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶 ×

𝑀(𝑀+1)
2

=

𝑁(𝑀+1)

( 3.1 )

2

Where C = cache_size, M = minichain_len, and N=CM.
The above formula is derived under the simplifying assumption that N is divisible by C.
The cost TotalHCost is the sum of two components: a cost of (C-1)M for the initial filling of
the cache values and a cost of (C-1)M(M+1)/2 for the N transactions. Notice that (C-1) of the
N transactions will not need to perform any hashing since the required value is already in the
cache. For the above example of N = 100 and C = 5, transaction # 21 will simply read V80 from
cache[4]. The maximum and average value of the transaction execution overhead are given by

HCostmax = M
HCostavg =

// for the 1st transaction

0.5×(𝐶−1)×(𝑀−1)

( 3.2 )

𝐶

In section 3.4, we evaluate the tradeoffs of the sparse caching scheme and examine
policies for selecting the cache size C for different values of N. It is important to notice that the
sparse caching scheme is applied only to the user mobile device, not to the server. The server
can compute the same authentication tokens using any caching scheme; for example it may use a
complete caching scheme that stores all authentication tokens in the cache during initialization.
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3.2.2

Weighted Overhead Formula

For a session with N transactions and a user with a certain mobile device, what would be
the best cache_size C? In answering this question, we first recognize that wireless users can use
mobile devices having a wide range of capabilities. Some users may use high-end laptops that
have plenty of storage resources while others may use mobile phones with limited memory. We
use the following Weighted Overhead (WO) formula to obtain insight into the suitable value of
the cache_size C.

WO = 𝑊 × 𝐶𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

( 3.3 )

Where w is the weight assigned to the cost of using memory in the mobile device. The
Weighted Overhead formula is simply a pragmatic approach to select the size of the cache for the
different categories of mobile devices. The Weighted Overhead WO obtained from the formula
can be viewed as the combined cost of memory and execution overhead where w is the cost of
memory relative to a unit cost of execution. The value of w may be assigned based on classes.
For example, we may have three classes of mobile devices with the following weights.
Class 1: w1 is used for high-end laptops with plenty of memory.
Class 2: w2 is used for mobile devices, e.g., high end smartphones and tablets, with
reasonable but constrained memory resources.
Class 3: w3 is used for mobile devices, e.g. low-end mobile phones, with very limited
memory resources.
We have the obvious relationship w3 > w2 > w1. To choose the best cache size for a
mobile device, we simply minimize the value of the Weighted Overhead. For Class 1, the value
of w1 is nearly zero and the minimization problem reduces to minimizing the second term
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TotalHCost. Minimizing TotalHCost is achieved by choosing the largest possible value of cachesize, which is simply N. This means that for high-end laptops, the sparse caching scheme is
replaced by complete caching in which the authentication token value Vj is obtained by fetching
cache[j] without performing any hash computation. For Class 2 and 3, plotting the value of
Weighted Overhead versus cache_size could reveal the best size that minimizes the combined
cost.
In section 3.4.4, we present performance results that show how the Weighted Overhead
formula can be used to gain insight into selecting the size of cache.
3.2.3

Uncertainty in the Number of Transactions

In all previous discussions, we assumed that the number of transactions in a session, N, is
accurately known. In real-life applications, however, the value of N is usually only
approximately known. If the application developer chooses a value for N that is too small, the
hash chain will be exhausted before finishing all of the transactions of the session. If the selected
value of N is too large, the transactions will have large execution overhead. It is difficult for an
application developer to consistently strike a good balance of N for the different sessions of the
different users. The sparse caching approach presented earlier comes into play to elegantly solve
this problem. Below, we elaborate on this issue.
Suppose that we know that a session will have approximately 1000 transactions but there
is some likelihood that it could have up to 2000 transactions. Without any caching, the developer
will be tempted to choose a value of N between 1000 and 2000 to strike a balance between
reducing HCost for the individual transactions and avoiding the scenario of exhausting the chain
and resorting to costly HTTPS authentication and additional hash chain setup. By placing a
single cached value cache[1] = H1000(s) at the middle of the range, the developer can safely
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select N = 2000 with a guarantee that HCostmax will be 1000 and the costly HTTPS reinitialization will not be needed. By placing a second cached value at 2000, the developer can
extend the value of N to 3000 with the same guarantee that HCostmax will be 1000 and the costly
HTTPS initialization will not be needed. The sparse caching scheme can be used with few
cached units to extend the range of N to a large safe value without incurring an increase in the
execution overhead of individual transactions or running the risk of additional HTTPS setup.
In section 3.4, we present test results that illustrate the application of sparse caching for
the case of approximate values of N.
3.2.4

Sparse Caching with Non-uniform Spacing

The case of uncertain values of N motivates the use of sparse caching with non-uniform
distribution. We elaborate on this by an example.
Suppose it is highly probable that the number of transactions in a user session will be 100
or less but there is some small probability that this number could go up to 500. As shown earlier,
we could use the sparse caching scheme to set the value of N to 500 without increasing the value
of HCostmax above 100. We can actually do better than this by choosing non-uniform cache
spacing to significantly improve the execution overhead of the first likely 100 transactions. For
example, we can distribute 9 cache values non-uniformly as follows:
cache[0] = s
cache[1] = H100(s)
cache[2] = H200(s)
cache[3] = H300(s)
cache[4] = H400(s)
cache[5] = H420(s)
cache[6] = H440(s)
cache[7] = H460(s)
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cache[8] = H480(s)
The above scheme gives priority to the first 100 transactions with a guaranteed value of
HCostmax = 20. The other less likely 400 transactions will be guaranteed a value of
HCostmax=100.
Schemes for the forward generation and reverse presentation of one-way hash chains can
use different topologies including tree topologies. But the simplicity of the proposed sparse
caching authentication scheme and its flexibility in dealing with different scenarios (such as the
non-uniform spacing discussed in this section or the geometric spacing discussed in the next
section) make the scheme more practically appealing than other schemes for implementing oneway hash chains [80].
In section 3.5, we present the results of our tests to evaluate non-uniform spacing for
sparse caching.
3.2.5

Caching with Geometric Spacing

In the previous section, the non-uniform spacing of cached values was achieved by
creating two groups: the high priority group (first 100 transactions in the above example) and the
low priority group (the remaining less likely 400 transactions). Within each group, the cached
values are distributed uniformly. This scheme is suitable when the value of N is not accurately
known but there is knowledge about the minimum value of N, i.e., the number of transactions
that are most likely or are guaranteed to occur. If this knowledge is not available (i.e., the value
of N could range from a small number to a large number), it would be better to distribute the
cached values at progressively increasing intervals. One possible progressive strategy is the
geometric distribution scheme. We illustrate this scheme using the previous example in which
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the value of N could be as small as 1 but could go up to 500. We use 9 cached values
geometrically distributed as follows:
cache[0] = s
cache[1] = H246(s)
cache[2] = H374(s)
cache[3] = H438(s)
cache[4] = H470(s)
cache[5] = H486(s)
cache[6] = H494(s)
cache[7] = H498(s)
cache[8] = H500(s)
The first transaction uses cache[8]= H500(s) and will not need to perform any hash
operations. The second and third transactions use cache[7]= H498(s), resulting in performing one
hash operation for the second transaction and no operation for the third transaction. The
transactions numbered 4, 5, 6, and 7 use cache[6]= H494(s) resulting in performing 3, 2, 1, and 0
hash operations, respectively for these four transactions. Notice that the cached values are
anchored at points that are geometrically spaced apart. The difference between the number of
hash operations performed for cache[8] and cache[7] is 2, between cache[7] and cache[6] is 4,
between cache[6] and cache[5] is 8, between cache[5] and cache[4] is 16, and so on. As the
number of transactions in the real session increases, the range of the number of hash operations
will increase geometrically and high-numbered transactions will need to perform larger number
of hash operations on average.
The result of the geometric distribution scheme is to give smaller HCostavg value for
earlier transactions. Shorter sessions will benefit more from the geometric distribution.
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In section 3.7, we present the results of our tests to evaluate sparse caching with
geometric spacing.
3.3

Energy Consumption

When designing any authentication protocol for mobile devices, it is important to reduce
the energy expended by this protocol. According to [81], there are at least three approaches to
preserving battery life in mobile devices: efficient hardware, accurate knowledge of energy
consumption of different cryptographic approaches and light weight security mechanisms. In
designing our protocol, one of our major goals was to come up with a light security mechanism
while ensuring the highest cryptographic strength available.
Energy consumption is largely influenced by the cryptographic hash function used in the
authentication scheme as different hash functions have different energy consumption levels. The
authors of [82] conducted an extensive analysis of energy characteristics of various
cryptographic approaches and found that energy varies according to the cryptographic approach
utilized. For SHA, SHA1 and HMAC, the energy required to conduct a single operation is 0.75,
0.76 and 1.16 microjoule/byte, respectively (for a complete list of energy consumption
characteristics of different cryptographic approaches, please refer to [82]). The level of energy
consumption by our authentication protocol in a user session is correlated with the value of
TotalHashCost described in section 3.2.1.
In section 3.8, we compare the energy consumption of our sparse caching protocol and
compare it with the case of no caching. It should be noted though that the initialization phase is
not included in this comparison because it is conducted using an HTTPS.
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3.4

Evaluation and Performance Results

To experiment with the sparse caching HACH scheme, we developed a benchmark which
was written using Java. The benchmark fully implements the one-way hash chain model and the
different sparse caching configurations.
In the tests and experiments to evaluate the performance of HACH, we considered
several situations and different scenarios. Our objective was to simulate real life connections
which are characterized by differing needs as far as storage and performance are concerned.
Therefore, we used the benchmark to evaluate the HACH performance with numbers of
transactions having different ranges: from 1 to 200 for short sessions, from 500 to 2500 for long
sessions and up to 4000 and 5000 transactions in some tests. We also varied the storage
availability to make sure that we address different users’ needs. The storage spaces used to
evaluate performance ranged from 20 to 500 spaces.
3.4.1

Impact of Cache Size on HACH Performance

Figure 3.1 shows the impact of cache size on the performance of HACH. The execution
overhead of HACH is measured by TotalHCost, the total number of hash operations in a session
including the initial cache setup. The spacing scheme used in Figure 3.1 is the uniform sparse
caching scheme described in section 3.2.1. The results in Figure 3.1 are obtained from the Java
testbed and they agree with the cost estimation derived in section 3.2.1. The results clearly show
that the more cache we have, the less the TotalHCost would be.
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Figure 3-1 Impact of cache size on TotalHCost
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the impact of cache size on the average value of the execution
overhead of one transaction (i.e. HCostavg). Again we see that the more cache we have, the less
the value of HCostavg. The sparse caching scheme speeds up transaction authentication and helps
in reducing the turnaround time of user requests.
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Figure 3-2 Impact of cache size on HCostavg
3.4.2

Cache Space Allocation Policies

In section 3.2.2, we proposed a Weighted Overhead formula and gave an example of
three classes for mobile devices used in wireless networks. For Class 1 (high-end laptops with
plenty of memory), we can afford to allocate large cache memory to get the best benefit of
HACH. For Classes 2 and 3 (mobile phones with limited capability), the memory allocated to
cache will be at a lesser level. To investigate the performance of sparse caching on the different
mobile devices, we used the following two policies for allocating cache memory to a user session
with N transactions:
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1- The square root (sqrt) policy which allocates cache_size = (N)0.5 for a session with N
transactions.
2- The logarithm (log2) policy which allocates cache_size = log2(N) for a session with N
transactions.
We have tested a few other policies but we select the above two policies for presentation
in this dissertation because they nicely suit the classification of mobile devices described in
section 3.2.2. The log2 policy is an aggressive policy which reserves more memory and therefore
can be used for Class 1 devices. The sqrt policy, on the other hand, exhibits a more conservative
behavior and reserves smaller amount of cache memory, which is suitable for low end mobile
devices of Class 2 and 3. Both policies can be multiplied by a scale factor (ranging from a small
fraction to a large number) to adapt the rate of memory allocation based on the capability of the
mobile device, e.g., to differentiate between Class 2 and Class 3.
Figure 3.3 shows the HACH execution overhead and Figure 3.4 shows the HACH storage
overhead of the sqrt and log2 cache allocation policies. The log2 policy allocates more cache
space and consequently incurs a much less TotalHCost. The sqrt policy allocates less cache
space and incurs much higher TotalHCost.
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Figure 3-4 HACH storage requirements with two policies for sparse caching
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3.4.3

Effectiveness of Sparse Caching

In this section, we present the simulation results when we compared the performance of
HACH with and without sparse caching. Table 3.1 summarizes the results we obtained from tests
using the square root (sqrt) policy. The Performance Ratio in the last column is the ratio
TotalHCost with no caching/TotalHCost with sparse caching. The sparse caching scheme
significantly improves performance of HACH. Sparse caching is able to decrease TotalHCost of
transactions by an average of approximately 41 times over the six values of N shown in Table
3.1.
Table 3-1 HACH performance with/without sparse caching using the sqrt policy
Number of
Transactions

TotalHCost
No Caching

TotalHCost
Sparse
Caching

Performance
Ratio

500

125250

5702

21.97

1000

500500

16404

30.51

1500

1125750

29811

37.76

2000

2001000

45750

43.74

3000

4501500

83625

53.83

4000

8002000

127506

62.76

In Figure 3.5, we further illustrate the performance improvement ratio of the HACH
using sparse caching. The x-axis represents the number of transactions and the left y-axis
represents the performance improvement ratio associated with every value of N. The right y-axis
shows the storage requirement for each value of N. We notice that each added cache unit
decreases the value of TotalHCost. This is intuitive since if we can afford more memory, we
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would definitely improve performance. However, in the case of mobile phones and other lowend mobile devices, the storage may not always be readily available and we need to find a
compromise
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Figure 3-5 HACH performance improvement ratio
3.4.4

Selecting Cache Size for Mobile Devices

In order to find the best tradeoff between cache size and performance (measured in
TotalHCost), we introduced the Weighted Overhead formula
𝑊𝑂 = 𝑊 × 𝐶𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

( 3.4 )

In the simulation tests, we experimented with different values of w to represent the
different classes. For Class 1 devices, the value of w was a small value close to zero because
memory consumption is not a substantial issue with high-end devices. Higher values of w are
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used for Class 3 devices and lower values are used for Class 2 devices. We ran tests for different
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Figure 3-6 Weighted Overhead results for N=500
Figure 3.6 shows the best cache size when the number of transactions is 500. The left yaxis represents the value of the Weighted Overhead and the right y-axis is the value of
TotalHCost. The values of weights are w1 = 0.1 representing Class 1 devices, w2 = 12
representing Class 2 devices and w3=35 representing Class3 devices. The dashed curve is used to
indicate TotalHCost. We notice that for this particular number of transactions (N=500), a cache
size of 50 units is the most suitable for Class 3 devices as it exhibits the lowest Weighted
Overhead value which strikes an acceptable tradeoff between TotalHCost and memory. For
Class 2 devices, the best cache size is 100. We notice for Class 1 devices represented by w1, the
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Weighted Overhead curve is very close to the TotalHCost curve, indicating that we should select
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Figure 3-7 Weighted Overhead results for N=1000
Figure 3.7 shows the same test but with N=1000. The same w values reported for Figure
3.6 were used here. For Class 3 devices (w3 curve), the best cache size is slightly over 100. For
Class 2 devices (w2 curve), the best size of cache is 250. For Class 1 devices (w1 curve), it is
best to use complete caching of size 1000.
We further analyzed the performance of sparse caching for HACH using a metric called
the speedup factor per unit cache (or simply the speedup factor) defined as follows:
𝐻1

𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑝 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = (𝐻2×𝐶)
Where
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H1 = the value of TotalHCost without caching, and
H2 = the value of TotalHCost with sparse caching of size C
Table 3.2 gives the results for the speedup factor for Class 3 (weight w3=35) when the
cache size used is the best cache size selected by the Weighted Overhead formula. Table 3.2
shows that the contribution of one cache unit is captured by a speedup value of approximately
0.9. As an example for N = 500 transactions and cache size C = 50, each cache unit improves the
performance by a magnitude of 0.91 and the total cache of size 50 increases performance by a
magnitude of 45.5 resulting in decreasing the total number of hashes from 125250 to 2750.
Table 3-2 Speedup factor per unit cache for Class 3
Number of
Transactions

Cache Size

H2

H1

Speedup

500

50

2750

125250

0.91

1000

100

5500

500500

0.91

1500

150

8250

1125750

0.91

2000

250

9000

2001000

0.89

3000

250

18000

4501500

1.00

4000

500

18000

8002000

0.89

Table 3.3 shows similar results for Class 2 devices (w2 = 12). The cache sizes used for
these devices are bigger than those of Class 3. It should be mentioned that for values of N equal
to 2000 and higher, the weight w2 = 12 gave multiple best cache sizes (giving the same
Weighted Overhead value). We therefore used a weight value w2 = 15 to pick the specific cache
size shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3-3 Speedup factor per unit cache for Class 2
Number of
Transactions

Cache Size

H2

H1

Speedup

500

50

2750

125250

0.91

1000

100

5500

500500

0.91

1500

150

8250

1125750

0.91

2000

250

9000

2001000

0.89

3000

250

18000

4501500

1.00

4000

500

18000

8002000

0.89

For Class 1 devices (w1  0), the Weighted Overhead formula suggests using complete
caching. Table 3.4 gives the results for the speedup factor for Class 1 (weight w1  0) when the
cache size used is equal to the value of N. The speedup factor for Class 1 with complete caching
is 0.50.
Table 3-4 Speedup factor per unit cache for Class 1
Number of
Transactions

Cache
Size

H2

H1

Speedup

500

500

500

125250

0.50

1000

1000

1000

500500

0.50

1500

1500

1500

1125750

0.50

2000

2000

2000

2001000

0.50

3000

3000

3000

4501500

0.50

4000

4000

4000

8002000

0.50
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3.5

HACH with Non-uniform Cache Spacing

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 give comparisons between sparse caching with uniform spacing and
with non-uniform spacing. For non-uniform spacing, we allocated 50% of the cache for the first
20% of transactions, which we call “high priority transactions”. The other 50% of the cache is
used to serve the remaining 80% transactions, which we call the low priority (uncertain)
transactions.

Table 3.5 analyzes the average authentication time (average number of hash

operations) of a high priority transaction. The non-uniform spacing gives superior (much
smaller) authentication time compared to the uniform spacing. The last column in Table 3.5
gives the value of speedup for a high priority transaction. For example when N = 500, the
average authentication time for a high priority transaction using non-uniform spacing is 1.5 hash
operations whereas the corresponding figure for uniform spacing is 4.5. This means that high
priority transactions enjoy a three-fold speedup under the non-uniform spacing scheme compared
to the uniform spacing scheme. As the number of transactions goes up, the speedup factor
decreases slightly and becomes equal to 2.55 at N = 4000
Table 3-5 Average speedup for a high-priority transaction
Number of
Transactions

High
Priority

Non
Uniform
Spacing

Uniform
Spacing

Speedup

500

100

1.5

4.5

3.00

1000

200

3.5

9.5

2.71

1500

300

5.5

14.5

2.64

2000

400

7.5

19.5

2.60

3000

600

11.5

29.5

2.57

4000

800

15.5

39.5

2.55
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Table 3.6 analyzes the average authentication time (average number of hash operations)
of a low priority transaction. The non-uniform spacing gives larger (slower) turnaround time
compared to the uniform spacing. The last column in Table 6 gives the value of the slow-up for a
low priority transaction. Notice that the uniform-spacing scheme gives the same speed for both
high priority transactions (Table 3.5) and low priority transactions (Table 3.6). From Tables 3.5
and 3.6, we see that the non-uniform caching scheme has positively impacted high-priority
transactions by a speedup factor of 2.5 or higher and has negatively impacted low-priority
transactions by a slow-up factor of only 1.67 or less.
Table 3-6 Average slow-up of a low-priority transaction
Number
of
Transactions

Low Priority
N

Non Uniform
Spacing

Uniform
Spacing

Slowup

500

400

7.5

4.5

1.67

1000

800

15.5

9.5

1.63

1500

1200

23.5

14.5

1.62

2000

1600

31.5

19.5

1.62

3000

2400

47.5

29.5

1.61

4000

3200

63.5

39.5

1.61

3.6

Approximate Knowledge of N

In the previous sections, we performed our simulation tests assuming that the value of N
is accurately known. The value of N in most real life applications is not accurately known. A
minimal level of sparse caching can help the developer apply hash chains of larger length
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without the fear of any increase in the average or maximum authentication time for a transaction.
Figure 3.8 shows the impact of using sparse caching with minichain_len set at 1000 for sessions
with unknown number of transactions exceeding 1000. It can be seen that sparse caching reduces
HCostavg of transactions when N is not precisely known. For example, when N = 4000
transactions, the value of HCostavg without sparse caching is approximately 1500. By placing
only three cache units, the value of HCostavg is reduced to 375. We observed that the reduction in
HCostavg due to sparse caching increases as the number of transactions increases.
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Figure 3-8 Handling unknown large values of N: comparison between HCostavg with and
without sparse caching
3.7

Geometric Spacing

In section 3.2.5, we introduced the idea of geometric spacing of cache which gives
smaller HCostavg value for earlier transactions in cases when the exact number of transactions N
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is not known and could be as small as one and as large as N. The idea involves increasing the
cache spacing intervals progressively as the real number of transactions increases.
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Figure 3-9 Comparison of HCostavg between Uniform, Non-Uniform and Geometric
Spacing
Figure 3.9 shows the test results for the case when N is not known and the developer has
chosen the value N = 500 to be the length of the hash chain. The horizontal axis represents the
real number of transactions, denoted K. The figure compares the performance of the following
three schemes for values of K = 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 200.
- Uniform caching with equal spacing as described in section 3.2.1.
- Non-uniform caching with two groups as described in section 3.2.4.
- Geometric spacing as described in section 3.2.5.
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As seen in Figure 3.9, using the geometric spacing policy improves the performance of
HACH compared to the other two policies when the real number of transactions K is lower than
50. For the case K = 50, the geometric spacing performs better than uniform spacing and has the
same performance as the non-uniform spacing policy. For K = 100 transactions, geometric
spacing still performs better than uniform spacing but worse than non-uniform spacing. The
geometric spacing scheme does not benefit HACH when K  120 transactions.
3.8

Energy Consumption

In section 3.3, we introduced the energy consumption metric used to evaluate the
performance of our sparse caching protocol. Since the energy consumption is largely influenced
by the cryptographic hash function used, the type and amount of hashing operations required to
carry out the authentication of the internet session translate into the energy consumption of the
authentication scheme.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the energy consumption comparison between our sparse caching
based HACH protocol and its counterpart without sparse caching. It should be noted that the
sparse caching in this comparison is conducted using the sqrt policy and SHA-1 hashing. As can
be seen in the figure, our sparse caching scheme tremendously improves energy consumption of
the HACH authentication protocol. It is also noted that the HACH protocol suffers from a huge
increase in energy consumption making it far from ideal especially for platforms with limited
energy capacities.
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Figure 3-10 Energy consumption comparison of HACH with and without sparse caching
3.9

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have shown that the use of lightweight easy to implement sparse
caching approach can significantly improve the performance of the widely used cryptographic
one-way hash chain technique to secure session cookies. We introduced a memory-timescomputation complexity metric to help select a best cache size depending on different users’
storage requirements. Different cache spacing techniques have been investigated to demonstrate
different connection behaviors.
We presented the results of extensive performance tests that have shown the significant
reduction in authentication cost achieved by the sparse caching schemes. We have also shown
how to deal with real-life situations in which the number of transactions per user session is
largely unknown and cannot be accurately estimated.
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CHAPTER 4: HACH WITH A HIERARCHICAL TWO-TIER
CONSTRUCTION (TTOHC)
In this chapter, we present our second contribution to solve the computational overhead
of the HACH protocol discussed in Chapter Two. The two-tier one-way hash chain protocol
revolves around utilizing different cryptographic hash functions arranged in two tiers. The
TTOHC protocol gives significant performance improvement over previously proposed solutions
for securing Internet cookies. A detailed Java testbed has been used to evaluate alternative
configurations for the hierarchical scheme and investigate the optimal set up of the two tiers.
Detailed performance results obtained from this testbed are presented and analyzed.
4.1

Proposed Scheme

A. The Two-Tier One-way Hash Chain (TTOHC) Protocol
Our TTOHC protocol is based on the idea of utilizing two levels of hashing that use
different cryptographic hash algorithms, e.g., SHA-1 and HMAC. The OHC (OTC and SCRHC
[83] are examples of OHC) scheme has a single one-way hash chain and the length of this chain
represents the number of transactions N. The TTOHC scheme, on the other hand, has a single
first-tier chain and multiple second-tier chains. The variable N is divided into two components:
the length of the first-tier chain Nf and the length of the second-tier chain Ns. Although we will
primarily focus on the static case where all second-tier chains have the same length Ns, we will
also present results on the dynamic case in which the length of the second-tier chain changes
linearly.
The

TTOHC

protocol

is

composed

of

three

routines:

Initialization,

Authenticate_Transaction, and Adjust_Seed. In the Initialization routine, a shared secret value S0,
the number of transactions N and length of the second-tier chain Ns are selected and exchanged
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between the server and the client. The authentication tokens transmitted in the cookies are
generated by the Authenticate_Transaction routine using the second-tier hash function HS. These
authentication tokens are denoted Vi,j where V represents the authentication token, i refers to the
first-tier index and j refers to the second-tier index. Each time the length of the second-tier hash
chain is exhausted, the Adjust_Seed routine is used to compute the new seed for the next secondtier chain. The new seeds are computed using the first-tier hash function HF. In what follows,
we give the notations and more details of the TTOHC protocol.
N= number of transactions in the session
Nf = length of the first-tier chain
Ns = length of the second-tier chain assuming the static case
N ≤ Nf  Ns ; ideally N = Nf  Ns
HF is the hash function used in the first-tier
HS is the hash function used in the second-tier
S0= Initial seed used by the first-tier chain
In our tests we used a message authentication code HMAC for HF and a hash function
SHA-1 for HS. The values generated in the first-tier are denoted S1, S2, S3, etc., and are used as
seeds for the second-tier chains as shown below.
S1 = HFNf(S0), S2 = HFNf -1(S0),....., SNf-1 = HF2(S0), SNf = HF(S0)
In our testbed, the HMAC algorithm used to implement HF uses two arguments: a seed
S0 and a message g; therefore, we created another argument g during initialization (g is the string
“first-tier”). The values generated in the second-tier chain are the authentication tokens used in
the authentication step for the successive transactions of a user’s session. User transactions
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numbered 1 to Ns use the tokens generated by the first second-tier chain based on the seed S1,
transactions numbered Ns+1 to 2Ns use the tokens generated by the second second-tier chain
based on S2 and so on. Specifically, the first transaction uses the token value V1,1 = HSNs(S1) .
The second transaction usesV1,2 = HSNs-1(S1) and the transaction numbered NS uses the token V1,Ns
= HS(S1). The token V1,Ns is the last token generated using the seed S1. For the next transaction,
numbered NS +1, the routine Adjust_Seed is invoked to compute the new seed S2 for the second
second-tier chain. After calling the Adjust_Seed routine, transaction numbered NS +1 uses the
authentication token V2,1 = HSNs(S2) . The pseudo codes for the three routines are given below.
Initialization:
The initialization stage takes place using an HTTPS connection. During the HTTPS
authentication, the initial value of the shared secret S0, a message g, the length of the hash chain
N and the length of the second-tier chain Ns are selected and exchanged between the server and
the client. The following code is executed at both the client and the server.
Nf := N ÷Ns
L:= Ns
J:= Nf

// length of the first-tier chain
// L is the global index for the second-tier chain
// J is the global index for the first-tier chain

S:= HFJ(S0) // S is now S1=seed for the first second-tier chain
The routine Authenticate_Transaction generates the authentication token V at the client
side. The authentication token is generated by the second-tier hash function HS. The token V is
then transmitted in the cookie of the transaction to the server where a similar routine is executed
to compute the value V at the server. The server compares the received value and the computed
value to authenticate the transaction.
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Authenticate_Transaction(S,L)
Begin
V:= HSL(S) // L is the global index for the second-tier chain
L:= L -1
if (L==0) then
S:= Call Adjust_Seed( )
L:= Ns; end_if
Return (V);
End
For example, if N=500 transactions and Ns=100, then Nf = 5 and the authentication tokens
will be computed as follows:
1st transaction uses token V1,1 = HS100(S1),
2nd transaction uses token V1,2 = HS99(S1),
….….,
100th transaction uses token V1,100 = HS(S1),
101st transaction uses tokenV2,1 = HS100(S2),
102nd transaction uses token V2,2 = HS99(S2),
……..,
200th transaction uses token V2,100 = HS(S2),
……..,
401st transaction uses token V5,1 = HS100(S5),
……....,
500th transaction uses token V5,100 = HS(S5),
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The Adjust_Seed routine generates the seeds for the second-tier chains using the first-tier
hash function HF as given blow.
Adjust_Seed( )
Begin
J := J-1

// J is the global index for the first-tier chain

S:= HFJ(S0);
Return (S)
End
4.2

Performance Results

To evaluate the proposed TTOHC protocol and investigate its optimal setup, we wrote a
detailed benchmark in Java. We used a metric, SessionCost, which is the total cost of the hash
operations in both the first-tier chain and all second-tier chains during the entire lifetime of the
session. In the SessionCost metric, the unit cost is normalized to be the cost of a hashing
operation computed by SHA-1 (the cost of HMAC is higher). We use this metric as an indicator
of the computational overhead. The higher the SessionCost is, the higher the computational
overhead associated with transmission of cookies. We conducted extensive tests to account for
different real life scenarios including long sessions in which the user opts for the ‘remember me’
option offered by many web applications. In our experiments, we took into consideration the
discrepancy of session length in real life and so approximated the results. The results are an
average of 1000 simulations. Below we present and analyze our performance results.
A. Comparison between TTOHC and OHC
Figure 4.1 compares the performance of the TTOHC protocol with the non-hierarchical
OHC scheme for different values of N. In Figure 4.1, the TTOHC protocol used the same
second-tier chain length Ns=20 for all values of N. It is easy to see that TTOHC outperforms
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OHC by a wide margin. The cost comparison indicates that the TTOHC protocol decreases the
computational overhead represented by the metric SessionCost tremendously. For example when
the session has N=500 transactions, the session cost of OHC is 250, whereas the corresponding
cost of TTOHC is approximately 13. The difference in performance grows as the number of
transactions increases showing the benefit of our proposed scheme.
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Figure 4-1 Comparison between OHC and TTOHC (Ns=20)
To further illustrate the benefit of the TTOHC over OHC, we plotted (in Figure 4.2) the
performance improvement ratio between the session cost of TTOHC and the session cost of
OHC. The performance improvement ratio ranges from 21 at N=500 to 83 at N=3000. The
average improvement ratio of TTOHC over OHC in Figure 4.2 is 56. The two-tier one-way hash
chain scheme achieves great performance gain and significantly reduces the computational
overhead of the OHC scheme.
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We next investigate the problem of how to select the value of the length of the secondtier chain Ns. The value of Ns, selected during initialization, affects the length of the first-tier
chain Nf and significantly impacts performance of the TTOHC protocol.
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Figure 4-2 TTOHC to OHC Performance Improvement Ratio in the Static case
B. Selecting Ns in the Static Case
In the static case, the value of Ns is set up during initialization and is not changed
throughout the duration of the session. Once the first second-tier chain is exhausted and the
Adjust_Seed is called to generate the seed for the next second-tier chain, the value of Ns is reset
to its original value selected during initialization. This is repeated for all second-tier chains until
the session is completed.
The performance of the TTOHC protocol when Ns is static is illustrated in Figure 4.3
which plots SessionCost versus Ns.
63

180000
N=500

160000

N=1000

140000

N=1500

SessionCost

120000

N=2000

100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
100

50

25

20

10

5

Ns
Figure 4-3 TTOHC Performance for static Ns
Figure 4.3 shows that the performance of TTOHC is optimal when the value of Ns is
between 20 to 25. This means that we should select the hash chain length of the second-tier chain
to be in the range 20-25. In fact, the value Ns = 20 tends to strike a good balance for minimizing
SessionCost over all values of N. It should be noted that the value Ns = 20 is only optimal for the
particular setup we used in our tests, i.e., when HMAC is used to implement HF in the first-tier
chain and SHA-1 is used to implement HS in all second-tier chains. Choosing different hash
function will certainly change the optimal chain length value. For example, when we swapped
the two functions and used the more expensive HMAC in the second-tier chains and SHA-1 in
the first-tier chain, the optimal value of Ns was found to be around 10.
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C. Dynamic Ns
We also investigated the use of dynamic values for Ns, i.e., the length of the second-tier
chain is not always the same. In this case, the value of Ns dynamically changes each time the
Adjust_Seed routine is called. There are several options of dynamic Ns configurations, but we
will report the results of the case when Ns increases linearly. The linear increase of the value of
Ns means that an initial value Ns is selected for the first second-tier chain and is increased by a
certain amount in the successive chains. In our tests we used an initial value Init_Ns = Ns as the
length of the first second-tier chain, 2*Ns as the length of the second second-tier chain, 3*Ns as
the length of the third second-tier chain and so on until the session is completed. In order to
account for this increase, we modified the code of the Initialization routine so that we can
compute the length of the first-tier chain Nf needed to produce the seeds for the second-tier
chains in the dynamic case. We also modified the Adjust_Seed routine by letting it handle the
dynamic Ns update as follows:
Adjust_Seed( )
Begin
Ns:= Ns + Init_Ns // Ns increases linearly
J:= J-1
S:= HFJ(S0);
Return (S)
End

To illustrate this, let us examine how the code works to handle N = 500 transactions when
Ns is linearly updated. Below we give the authentication token values produced for the
successive transactions when N = 500, Init_Ns = 2 and the length of second-tier chain increases
linearly as explained above. The Initialization routine uses the values N = 500 and Init_Ns = 2 to
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compute the maximum possible value of Nf (i.e. the number of times the seed is going to be
updated). The maximum value of Nf in this case is 22 (i.e., there are 22 second-chair chains
needed to cover all 500 transactions.) The following are the authentication tokens for the
dynamic case when the initial value of Ns is 2.
V1,1 = HS2(S1)
V1,2 = HS1(S1)
V2,1 = HS4(S2)
V2,2 = HS3(S2)
V2,3 = HS2(S2)
V2,4 = HS (S2)
….
V22,38 = HS7(S22)

In the above example, the first transaction (with token V1,1)

performs two hash

operations. The second transaction (with token V1,2) performs one hash operation. Then, the
value Ns has to be updated by the Adjust_Seed routine to Ns = 4 and a new seed S2 is computed.
By the 500th transaction, we will have updated the value of Ns twenty two times.
Figure 4.4 shows how linearly increasing Ns impacts the performance of the TTOHC
protocol. Here, we can see that if we start Ns from a low value (e.g. Init_Ns = 1 or 2), we achieve
better performance. If the initial value of Ns starts at a relatively high value, say 20, the protocol
suffers from a large overhead as the SessionCost tends to be high. So, a low initial value of
Init_Ns = 1 or 2 would be the best choice for the dynamic case with linear increase.
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Figure 4-4 TTOHC performance when Ns changes linearly
The performance (SessionCost) of TTOHC with the dynamic configuration for Ns is
relatively higher than the static configuration. Nevertheless, this dynamic configuration still
results in a much better performance than the OHC scheme. Figure 4.5 demonstrates how the
TTOHC scheme with dynamic configuration outperforms the OHC by a large ratio. Comparing
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.5, we see that the static configuration gives better performance
improvement ratio than the dynamic configuration, especially at high values of N. Figure 4.6
gives a comparison between the two TTOHC configurations. In Figure 4.6, we used the optimal
value of Ns for both configurations, i.e., Ns = 20 for the static configuration and Init_Ns = 1 for
the dynamic configuration. As shown in the figure, the performance of the two configurations is
comparable when the number of transactions is low, but the static configuration tends to
outperform its dynamic counterpart at higher number of transactions.
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Although the dynamic configuration does not match the performance of the static one, it
has some practical merit when the value of N is not known and has a wide range that extends
from a very small number to a large number. In this case, the dynamic TTOHC configuration
would be practically acceptable because the early (more certain) transactions would be
authenticated by second-tier chains of small lengths (e.g., 1, 2, 4, 8) and are therefore given good
performance.
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4.3

Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented a protocol for the efficient authentication of session cookies.
Our protocol uses two tiers of one-way hash chains to reduce the overhead of the flat one-way
hash chain significantly. Our testbed for the proposed scheme used two good cryptographic hash
functions (HAMC for first-tier hashing and SHA-1 for second-tier hashing). The use of
cryptographically strong hash functions is recommended to increase the resistance of the scheme
to collision and per-image attacks.
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CHAPTER 5: HACH FOR COLLABORATIVE AND SOCIAL MEDIA
NETWORKS
5.1

Introduction

The use of insecure cookies as a means to authenticate web transactions in collaborative
and social media websites presents a hazard to users’ privacy. In this chapter, we propose and
evaluate a novel protocol for protecting transmitted cookies using two dimensional one-way hash
chains. In the first dimension, there is a hash chain that computes secret values used in the
second dimension hash function. Multiple hash chains use the secret values created by the first
dimension to authenticate session cookies in the second dimension. For improved security, the
hashing operations in the second dimension use a concatenation of the secret values and the
position index of the hash function within the hash chain. The performance of the scheme is
evaluated using a detailed simulation testbed and an analytical model. The optimal lengths of the
chains are derived when the number of transactions in the session is known. The protocol is
extended to efficiently handle the case when the number of transactions is not known. The
evaluation of the proposed scheme reveals that it achieves tremendous improvement over
straightforwardly configured one-way hash chain schemes. Also, by adopting the positionindexed hashing protocol, energy consumption is reduced significantly especially with longer
sessions making our protocol ideal for battery operated devices.
In designing our protocol, we took into consideration different cryptographic approaches.
While one of our main objectives is reducing the computational overhead of one-way hash
chains based cookies, we wanted our protocol to benefit from the features of current
cryptographic approaches especially their strength and resistance to replay attacks, collision
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attacks, pre-image attacks and second pre-image attacks. Hence, our protocol is designed with
the state-of-the art cryptographic approaches in mind.
5.2

The Proposed Protocol

A. Conceptualization
Conceptually, the one way hash chains in our protocol are arranged in two dimensions
(Figure 5.1). In the first dimension (i.e. horizontal axis), there is a single hash chain that
computes the seeds for the second dimension chains (i.e. vertical axis). In the second dimension,
multiple hash chains use these seeds to generate authentication tokens. The authentication tokens
are derived by hashing the seeds and the position of the hashing functions in the hash chains (e.g.
via a concatenation process ||). Given the cryptographic hash function used is resistant to attacks
(e.g. SHA-1, SHA-2 or SHA-3), a slight change in the argument to be hashed is expected to
result in a significantly different output. Figure 5.1 provides a conceptual view of how the
proposed protocol functions.

Figure 5-1 Position-indexed hashing for 12 transactions TChain_Len= 3, SChain_Len= 4
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The proposed protocol is composed of three main stages: the Initialization stage,
Authenticate_Token stage and Next_Seed stage. The notations we use in our scheme are
summarized in Table 5.1.
1) Initialization stage
During the initialization stage, which is done using an HTTPS protocol, information
about the session length (i.e., number of transactions N), an initial secret S0 and TChain_Len is
exchanged between the server and the client. Once this information is exchanged, the
SChain_Len is determined by dividing N by TChain_Len. The result of this division will give us
the number of seeds that will be needed during an internet session. Our definition of a session
refers to the communication activities between the web application and the client during the
login time (i.e. between log-in and log-out). A transaction on the other hand is a set of request
and response between the web application and the client. The session is composed of N
transactions. Information about the session length, TChains are predetermined and exchanged
during this stage.
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Table 5-1 Notations used in the proposed scheme
Notations

Description

N

Number of transactions to be handled during an internet session.

SChain

The chain where seeds are generated.

TChain

The chain where authentication tokens are generated.

S0

The initial seed used by the SChain

SChain_Len

Length of the SChain.

TChain_Len

Length of the TChain.

H

Hash function used to generate seeds or authentication tokens.

V

Authentication token.

2) Authenticate_Token stage
The next stage Authenticate_Token, is where the authentication tokens are actually
produced. The authentication tokens are denoted Vi,j where the variable i represents the current
TChain and j represents the current transaction number within the TChain. The tokens are
created by hashing the seed concatenated || with a variable indicating the position of the hash
function in the TChain. This position indexing technique is a well-known technique for boosting
security because Birthday Attacks can be avoided if all hash functions used are indexed by their
position in the chain [80]. As will be explained in the Next_Seed stage, we also update the seed
several times during the session. The number of times the seed is updated depends on the number
of transactions and the value of TChain_Len. This number is used to indicate how many TChains
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we will have during the session. In other words, each updated seed is only used by the
transactions of one TChain and then discarded and never used again.
3) Next_Seed stage
The third component of the protocol is the Next_Seed routine. This routine is responsible
for updating the seeds used in the TChains to generate authentication tokens. It should be noted
that each TChain has its own seed. This routine is invoked once the authentication tokens of the
first TChain are created and transmitted. Based on the number of transactions and TChain_Len
exchanged in the initialization stage, we know the number of times the seed is expected to be
updated. The length of the seed chain, SChain_Len, is a result of dividing the number of
transactions N by the value TChain_Len. Once the authentication tokens have all used a seed
once (i.e. TChain_Len is exhausted), the Next_Seed routine is invoked to produce an updated
seed for the next authentication token chain; TChain. We illustrate in the following section how
our protocol works with a pseudo code and detailed examples. The performance evaluation
results of the proposed scheme are presented in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
B. Selecting a Cryptographic Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function is an algorithm which changes a certain set of data into a
string of a fixed size, called the block size. Examples of cryptographic hash functions include
MD4, MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2. It was proven that the MD5 hash function is prone to collision
attacks [84] , [85] as well as pre-image attacks [86], and therefore, we did not consider it in our
scheme. While SHA-1 is resistant to pre-image attacks, it was proven by [87] that it is
theoretically prone to collision attacks. However, since it is not practically susceptible to
collision attacks, we have used it in our protocol for the purpose of illustration.
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In our implementation, the original block size is 160-bit corresponding to SHA-1, but it
can easily be expanded to accommodate stronger cryptographic techniques that require larger
block sizes such as SHA-2 (in all its sizes) and SHA-3 once it is released by NIST.
5.3

Case of Known Number of Transactions

Accurate statistics about network traffic related to social networking sites can be helpful
in identifying the length of the one-way hash chain. However, it is not always the case that these
are readily available. Dacosta et al [10] conducted basic traffic analysis of the social networking
site “Facebook” and concluded that a typical session requires hundreds of transactions, and thus
they set their chain length at 1000. In our study, we have varied this chain length since different
social networking sites might have different requirements.

Following are the steps of the

protocol when the number of transactions is known.
5.4

The Proposed Protocol’s Steps

The initialization stage takes place using an HTTPS connection. During the HTTPS
authentication, the initial value of the secret key S0, the number of transactions N and the length
of TChain (i.e. TChain_Len) are selected and exchanged between the server and the client. The
following code is executed at both the client and the server sides.
SChain_Len:= N ÷ TChain_Len // length of the SChain
I:= SChain_Len
J:= TChain_Len
I

Seed:= H (S0)

// I is the global index for the SChain
// J is the global index for the TChain
// Seed is now Seed1=seed for the first TChain

The routine Authenticate_Token is executed once for each transaction to compute the
authentication tokens that will be transmitted with the transaction cookie.
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Authenticate_Token(Seed, J)
Begin
V:= HJ(Seed||J )

// J is the global index for the TChain where || is a concatenation of
the seed with the hash function position in the chain

J:= J -1
if (J==0) then

// TChain length is exhausted

Seed:= Call Next_Seed( )
J:= TChain_Len

// Seed has to be updated
// TChain length is reset

end-if
Return (V)
End
Next_Seed( )
Begin
I:= I-1

// I is the global index for the SChain

Seed:= HI(S0)

// updating the Seed value

Return (Seed)
End;
Let us now illustrate how the protocol works with an example. In case the number of
transactions is known to be N =200, and the TChain_Len =4, the seed is going to be updated 50
times (i.e., SChain_Len = 50) to carry out the hashing functions for 200 transactions.
We have I=50,

J=4,

Seed1= H50(S0)

The first TChain of four transactions will create the following authentication tokens.
V1,1= H4(Seed1||4)
V1,2= H3(Seed1||3)
V1,3= H2(Seed1||2)
V1,4= H1(Seed1||1)
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Once these authentication tokens have been transmitted, the Seed has to be updated to
Seed2= H49(S0) and J has to be reset to 4.
The next step is to generate the second set of four transactions which will be:
V2,1= H4(Seed2||4)
……..
V2,4= H1(Seed2||1)
The code continues to calculate the authentication tokens in each TChain until we reach
the 50th TChain. The 50th TChain will have the Seed50= H(S0) and its authentication tokens will
be:
V50,1= H4(Seed50||4)
……..
V50,4= H1(Seed50||1)
5.5

Protocol Evaluation

1) The Testbed
In this section, we present the protocol evaluation results when the number of
transactions in a session is known. We developed a detailed benchmark in Java which allowed us
to test different session scenarios. An important metric used in our tests is SessionCost which is
the total number of hash operations performed during the lifetime of the session. The metric
SessionCost represents the overall execution overhead of the protocol including the overhead of
the Initialization stage and the overhead of the Authenticate_Token routine for all transactions as
well as the overhead of the Next_Seed routine.
Figure 5.2 shows the performance of the protocol for different values of the number of
transactions N and the length of TChain. It is interesting to see that the value of SessionCost
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decreases as the value of TChain_Len increases until a certain point then starts to increase again.
For each value of N, there is a certain value of TChain_Len that minimizes the value of
SessionCost. We validate this behavior by an analytical model.
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Figure 5-2 Protocol Evaluation (known number of transactions)
2) Analytical Model
As we described earlier our protocol is composed of two chains: i) the seed generating
chain SChain represented by the horizontal axis in Figure 5.1, and ii) the authentication
generating chain TChain represented by the vertical (slanted) axis in Fig 5.1. For simplicity, we
assume that the cost of a single hash operation used in the SChain and TChain is the same
because they both use the same hashing algorithm (i.e. SHA-1); we will examine this assumption
later at the end of this section. The cost of a single session SessionCost= C is the sum of the
hashing operations required to generate authentication tokens in the vertical chains, CV, and the
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hashing operations required to update the seeds in the horizontal chain, CH. Here is how
SessionCost is calculated.
N= number of transactions
M= SChain_Len
K= TChain_Len
Cost of one vertical chain =
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The next formula can be used to plot C as a function of N and K.
C=
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𝑁

𝑁

𝑁

1

+ 2 + 2𝐾2 + 2𝐾 =(𝐾 + 1 + 𝐾2 + 𝐾)
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( 5.6 )

To find the optimal value of K which minimizes the cost C, we differentiate formula 5.6
and equate to 0
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐾

=

𝑁
2

2𝑁

1

(1 − 𝐾3 − 𝐾2 )
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( 5.7 )

1
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𝐾 3 − 𝐾 − 2𝑁 = 0

( 5.9 )
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Equation 5.9 can be used to derive the optimal value of K which corresponds to
TChain_Len. Table 5.2 gives the optimal value of TChain_Len obtained by solving the above
cubic equation numerically.
Table 5-2 TChain_Len OPTIMAL VALUE
Number of
Transactions

Optimal
TChain_Len

500

10.03

1000

12.625

1500

14.445

2000

15.895

Comparing Table 5.2 with Figure 5.2, we can see that the TChain optimal values which
we obtained from the simulation are very close to the optimal values obtained from the analytical
solution.
It should be mentioned that the above analytical solution was derived based on the
assumption that the hash operation used in the SChain and TChain have the same cost because
both use the same hash function SHA-1. A more accurate model can be easily developed to
account for the extra overhead of the concatenation operation used in the SChain. Since the cost
of the concatenation operation is much smaller than the cost of the hash operation, the slight
increase due to concatenation can be accurately modeled by multiplying the cost of CH by a
factor r which is slightly larger than 1. This will cause Equation 2 to be slightly modified as
follows: the second and third terms will be multiplied by the factor r. Solving this modified
equation gives optimal values very close to those given in Table 5.2.
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5.6

Protocol Comparison with OHC

In order to validate the efficiency of our protocol, we compared its performance with the
OHC protocol proposed in [10].
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Figure 5-3 Performance comparison between position-index hashing (PIH) and OHC
In Figure 5.3, we demonstrate the performance comparison between our protocol and the
OHC protocol. We compared the average cost of a single transaction in both protocols. In our
protocol, we were able to lower the average cost of the transaction tremendously. For instance,
for 500 transactions the average transaction cost of the OHC protocol is 250, whereas our
protocol lowers this average to a little over 11. While this average tends to increase significantly
with the increase in transaction numbers for the OHC protocol, our average stays relatively low
even with N= 2500 transactions where the average cost is 13.65.
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In order to further gain insight in the benefits of adopting our protocol, we measured the
performance improvement ratio when our protocol is chosen over the OHC. The performance
improvement ratio is defined as the ratio SessionCost of OHC : SessionCost of our PIH protocol.
Figure 5.4 displays the significant improvement our protocol achieves over OHC.
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Figure 5-4 Performance improvement ratio of OHC
Looking at Figure 5.4, we can easily gain insight on how choosing our protocol is
beneficial. Our protocol outperforms the OHC protocol by a little over 22 times when the
number of transactions is 500. This improvement ratio is much higher with higher transaction
numbers. When we have 2500 transactions to be handled in a session, our protocol outperforms
the OHC by over 91 times. This is a relatively wide margin and makes our protocol plausible.
The ratio is expected to be higher for longer sessions with higher transaction numbers.
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5.7

Unknown Number of Transactions

A. Certainty versus Uncertainty in Transaction Number
In designing the protocol, we took into consideration the possibility of certain versus
uncertain number of transactions. More often than not, it is very hard to estimate the exact
number of transactions to be handled in a single session in a social networking site. As we have
seen above in our discussion of Facebook session length statistics introduced in [10], the length
can range from a few hundred transactions to several hundreds. This has led us to devise two
different versions of the position-indexed hashing protocol to accommodate the two scenarios:
known number of transactions and unknown number of transactions.
We have already accounted for the case of known number of transactions in the previous
section, and this section is devoted to explicating the case of unknown number of transactions.
When the number of transactions is unknown, there is no way to calculate the SChain_Len and
hence the number of TChains in a session. Therefore, we needed to change the code slightly to
account for this discrepancy. During the Initialization stage instead of exchanging the number of
transactions N and the TChain_Len, the client and server exchange the TChain_Len and another
value representing the SChain_Len. The importance of SChain_Len specification comes from the
need to update the seed during the session multiple times. Since the transaction number is
unknown, we have no way of determining how many times the seed is going to be updated.
Given this scenario, we are faced with another problem. If the specified SChain_Len is not long
enough (i.e., the actual number of times we will have to update the seed is more than the value of
SChain_Len), we will need to repeat using one or more seeds, which could compromise the
security of the session. To solve this problem, we utilize the number of TChains in a session as
an index to be attached to the updated seed via a concatenation process ||. The index for TChain
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number can be derived from the TChain_Len and the Next_Seed routine. The first TChain in a
session is the one that uses the first seed and once the Next_Seed routine is invoked, the TChain
index is incremented and the new value is attached to the hashed seed.
B. The Modified Protocol
Here, we introduce how we modified the protocol to account for the case of unknown
number of transactions. We still have the three stages we had in the unknown number of
transactions case.
1) Initialization
The initialization stage takes place using an HTTPS connection. During the HTTPS
authentication, the initial value of the secret key S0, the length of the authenticate-token chain
TChain_Len and the length of the next-seed chain SChain_Len are selected and exchanged
between the server and the client. The following code is executed at both the client and the server
sides.
I:= SChain_Len

// I is the global index for the SChain

J:= TChain_Len

//J is the global index for the TChain

index:= 1

//a global variable indicating TChain
number where 1 refers to first TChain

Seed:= HI(S0||index)

// Seed is now Seed1=seed for the first
TChain

Authenticate_Token(Seed, J)
Begin
V:= HJ(Seed||J )

// J is the global index for the TChain

J:= J -1
if (J==0) then
index:= index + 1

// TChain_Len length is exhausted
// index incremented for the next TChain
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Seed:= Call Next_Seed( )

// Seed has to be updated

J:= TChain_Len

// TChain length is reset

end-if
Return (V)
End
Next_Seed( )
Begin
I:= I-1
if (I==0) then

// SChain length is exhausted

I:= SChain_Len

// I is reset to SChain_Len

end-if
Seed:= HI(S0||index);
Return (Seed)
End
Here is an example to help illustrate how the protocol handles the transmission of
authentication tokens when the number of transactions is unknown. During initialization, the
values of TChain_Len=4 and SChain_Len=10 will be selected and exchanged between the
server and client.
We have I=10, J=4,

index=1. We assign an index which represents the first TChain, and

therefore the first seed will be:
Seed1= H10(S0|| 1)
The first TChain will use Seed1 in the hashing function to derive the first set of
authentication tokens as follows…
V1,1= H4(Seed1||4)
V1,2= H3(Seed1||3)
V1,3= H2(Seed1||2)
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V1,4= H1(Seed1||1)
Now index becomes 2 which represents the second TChain, I =9, Seed has to be updated
to Seed2= H9(S0||2) and J has to be reset to 4.The second TChain will have the following
authentication tokens:
V2,1=H4(Seed2||4)
……..
V2,4= H1(Seed2||1)
After finishing ten TChains (i.e. 40 transactions) index becomes 11 which represents the
11th TChain, I has to be reset to 10, Seed has to be updated to Seed11= H10(S0||11) and J has to be
also reset to 4. If we did not use the TChain number as a value attached to S0 , we would have
been forced to recycle Seed1 as Seed11=Seed1=H10(S0). This could potentially compromise our
protocol as it becomes easier to detect the initial seed. By indexing the TChain number and using
its value in the hashing function, we are able to solve this problem.
Therefore, the 11th TChain (11th set of four transactions) will have authentication tokens
which will be:
V11,1= H4(Seed11||4)
……..
V11,4= H1(Seed11||1)
The protocol goes on according to this routine until the user or the server terminates the
session.
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C. Protocol Evaluation (unknown number of transactions)
In this section, we present the evaluation of our protocol when the number of transactions
is unknown. Figure 5.5 illustrates the results when the SChain_Len is fixed at 5, while Figure 5.6
demonstrates the protocol’s performance when the SChain_Len is fixed at 20. Our main goal
from this is to determine the best value of TChain_Len where the protocol performs relatively
well.
In both Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, regardless of the SChain_Len, the protocol seems to
perform well when the TChain_Len is set at 3. Unlike the case of known number of transactions
where we noticed some kind of correlation between TChain_Len and performance, in the case of
unknown number of transactions it is better to set TChain_Len at a relatively low value.
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Figure 5-5 Protocol Evaluation (Unknown number of transactions) SChain_Len= 5 all
the time
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Figure 5-6 Protocol Evaluation (Unknown number of transactions) SChain_Len= 20 all
the time
Our next task was to see what the best value of SChain_Len is when the TChain_Len is
fixed at 3. The next graph (Figure 5.7) represents the session cost of different number of
transactions with TChain_Len= 3 and different SChain_Len values.
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Figure 5-7 Protocol performance comparison when TChain_Len=3 and different
SChain_Len
Figure 5.7 indicates that there is a steady and direct relationship between SChain_Len and
performance measured in SessionCost. The lower the value SChain_Len, the better performance
we can achieve when we do not know the number of transactions during a session. In other
words, we need to start with relatively short chains in both the authenticate-token chain TChain
and the next-seed chain SChain.
5.8

Conclusion

One-way hash chains can be efficiently used in collaborative and social media networks
to overcome the problem of session hijacking in Internet sessions caused by stealing cookies. In
this chapter, we proposed a one-way hash chain protocol to address the problem of
overestimating the number of transactions during a session in the straightforwardly configured
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one-way hash chains. Our solution achieves its goal by utilizing two one-way hash chains; one is
responsible for updating the secret and the other for creating the authentication tokens attached to
the cookies using the secrets produced by the first chain. We also employ the position of the
hashing function in the chain in order to strengthen our protocol against attacks such as Birthday
attacks.
Our extensive evaluation of the protocol and comparison with other protocols yielded
encouraging results. We have been able to improve the performance of one-way hash chains
significantly while keeping the same levels of security.
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CHAPTER 6: HACH FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
6.1

Introduction

Different aspects of WSN security have been addressed in the literature. Among the
problems are user authentication [45], [46], [48], [49], and broadcast authentication [47], [88].
WSN security solutions have a general goal of improving WSN standards in terms of
authenticity, confidentiality and integrity. Conventional user and broadcast authentication
mechanisms are not as practical in WSNs due to the scarcity of memory and energy capacities of
sensor nodes.
Conversely, one of the best solutions for user and broadcast authentication is the use of
public-keys to secure communication. For example, Benenson et al. proposed a solution in which
user authentication is achieved by adopting public-key cryptography [45]. They basically use a
certificate/signature generated by a base station. What renders this technique impractical for
WSN is the high computation cost and large signature size. In addition, they make WSN
susceptible to DOS attacks draining energy resources. To remedy this problem, shortened publickey based solutions designed for WSNs have been suggested. Addressing the problem of
expensive user authentication if public-keys are used, Wang et al. suggested using a short public
key whose lifetime is much shorter than regular public keys [47]. This solution aims at reducing
computation, but it still suffers from vulnerability to DOS attacks.
The HACH protocol has been considered by several researchers as an efficient
mechanism to achieve user authentication in wireless sensor networks. One of the seminal papers
to take this route is the 𝜇TESLA scheme introduced in [89] which aimed at achieving broadcast
authentication. In 𝜇TESLA, the basic idea is to have a base station, assumed to be trusted all the
time, that acts as a user of sensor nodes services, i.e. the base station is where sensed information
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is collected and authenticated. Authentication is achieved by using one-way hash function h()
and using the hash preimages as keys in the Message Authentication Code (MAC). In the
initialization stage, the base station calculates a hashed value of a secret x based on the number
of nodes in the network and distributes it among relative sensor nodes in a unicast fashion. In the
subsequent transactions, a preimage of the hashed value is used as a key in MAC. In the next
stage, the sensors verify whether or not the hashed value and its preimage are consistent. The
problem with this technique is low scalability and the high computational cost due the unicast
nature of key distribution. To further improve 𝜇TESLA, Liu and Ning [90] suggested replacing
the unicast technique for distributing keys with a broadcast based technology.
One-way hash based solutions have also been attractive in user authentication schemes of
WSNs. One of the earliest implementations of user authentication employing one-way hash is
introduced in [91]. The one-way hash operation is used in the initial stages to verify the user
requesting access to the WSN is an authorized user. Subsequent user authentication schemes
which try to overcome the shortcoming of [91] include [92], [93] and [94]. Unlike the one-way
hash chains used in broadcast authentication where computational overhead is an issue of
concern, user authentication schemes do not suffer from such overhead since we only need oneway hash operations in the login stages.
In this chapter, we propose a novel scheme where the HACH approach is extended to
achieve broadcast authentication in addition to user authentication in WSN’s. The proposed
scheme uses a mini one-way hash chain protocol for user and broadcast authentication that is as
effective, while at the same time significantly reducing the computational overhead. We avoid
the potential security breach by using easily computed one time authentication tokens to secure
communication. Similar to the previous contributions, the proposed protocol is energy
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preserving, light and efficient. Our simulation and evaluation tests reflect its benefit over
straightforwardly configured one-way hash chains.
6.2

Network Model

For our protocol, we envision a star topology network where communication between the
user and the WSN is mediated by a central entity, called coordinator. Essentially, the
coordinator is a sensor node with special capabilities. The role of the coordinator is to manage
communication in the WSN by receiving queries from the users, communicating with sensor
nodes to get the sensed information, and fetching the results of users’ queries back to the user.
With this in mind, we assume the coordinator to be responsible for authentication in both
directions. In the user’s direction, the coordinator is expected to only allow identified users
holding the right credentials to access the network. In the sensor nodes direction, on the other
hand, the coordinator(s) delegates only authenticated sensors that hold the correct authentication
tokens at the time of the communication.

Figure 6-1 Network Model External Structure
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Figure 6.1 captures the main design aspects of the network external structure. Such
network is ideal in a medical or industry setting where the proximity of the sensor nodes makes it
almost impossible for physical capture of sensor nodes to occur. Moreover, given coordinators
are administered by network administrators who assign users such as physicians, nurses, quality
control workers, etc. access to the WSN, we can make sure that only authorized personnel can
access the network.
6.3

The Proposed MOHC Authentication Scheme

In this section, we introduce the formal description of our mini OHC (MOHC)
authentication scheme. There are three components of the proposed solution: the user’s mobile
device, the coordinator CO, and the sensor nodes SN. The user’s mobile device can be
configured by the network administrator and is equipped with network access capabilities in the
form of a username and a password. The user is anyone who is allowed to have access to the data
(e.g. in the case of WSN used in the medical field, it could be the physician, the patient or the
nurse etc.).
The network communication scenario consists of the following steps:
1) The network administrator provides WSN users with temporary login credentials that are
changed by the respective users after initial login. This step ensures that only authorized
personnel are allowed to have access to the WSN. By changing the password, we make sure
that administrators’ role is just to establish service.
2) Once logged in, the user communicates with the coordinator by sending a query asking for
data from the sensor nodes.
3) The coordinator sends requests to the respective sensor nodes.
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4) Once gathered, the sensor node(s) delivers the data to the coordinator who checks that each
replying sensor has the correct credentials, accepting data if this condition holds, otherwise,
data will be denied.
5) The coordinator replies to the user with the requested data.
6) Steps 2-5 are repeated for each query generated by the user in the current user session.
With this communication scenario in mind, we designed the protocol to achieve user and
broadcast authentication throughout the WSN session. Therefore, the protocol works in two
directions: the user direction and the SNs direction. In the user direction, once successfully
logged in to the network, login credentials will be substituted by a secret value (Secret), which
will be generated by the coordinator. This Secret automatically expires once the user logs out.
Each time the user logs in, there will be a new generated Secret. This secret will be used to
generate authentication tokens used to secure subsequent communication. The first
authentication token V1 will be the result of applying a hash function h(.) to the Secret||C, where
C is the current number of communications between CO and the user; initially C=0. Thus, the
first authentication token will have the value V1:= HK(Secret|| C), where K, the length of the hash
chain, is decremented after each iteration. Before each communication between the coordinator
and the user, the C index is incremented. In the subsequent transactions, and to avoid exposing
the Secret and potentially compromising the WSN, we replace the Secret in the hash function
with the preceding authentication token used in the previous communication. Thus, the second
authentication token V has the value V2:= HK-1(V1|| C+1), then V1 is disposed, and V2 is used
instead to generate the third authentication token which is V3:= HK-2(V2|| C+2) and so on. The
length of the chain K used in our implementation is 10. In [13], we proposed a scheme where
one-way hash chains are divided into smaller hash chains. The best length of a chain striking a
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good balance in terms of hash count falls between 10 and 25. Each time the chain length is
exhausted, the index K is reset.
In the sensor nodes direction, the protocol works a little differently. It actually works in
phases: the first phase occurs during deployment when sensor nodes identify themselves to the
coordinator. The coordinator subsequently distributes Seed0 among the sensor nodes which will
be used in a hash function at the sensor node’s side. The value of Seed0 is never exposed, but
used in a way similar to what we did with the Secret for the user authentication; i.e., as input for
a hash function h(.) to generate subsequent authentication tokens. The second phase is when the
actual communication begins when the coordinator relays a user’s query to SNs. In the first
round of communication, we use Seed0 to generate the first authentication token at the sensor
node’s side V1:= HK(Seed0|| Ci), where K is the hash chain length, decremented after each round,
and Ci is the number of communication rounds between sensor_node [i] and the coordinator;
initially Ci =0. The value of Ci is incremented before each round of communication. When Ci
reaches a certain value, C_limit, we reset its value to 0 to avoid large numbers, and also update
and broadcast Seed0 to sensor_node [i]. In the subsequent rounds, and to avoid exposing of Seed0
and potentially compromising the WSN, we replace Seed0 in the hash function with the
preceding authentication token. Thus, the second authentication token will be V2:= HK-1(V1|| Ci
+1), then, V1 is discarded. The third authentication token will be V3:= HK-2(V2|| Ci +2), V2 is
discarded, and so on. Once the hash chain length is exhausted, the index K is reset. Below a high
level pseudo code of the authentication token scheme described in this section is presented.
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Authentication token
Phase 1: Deployment Phase
Input: number of sensor nodes
Coordinator creates Seed0
Attach Seed0 to each Sensor node
Set number of communications Ci between Sensor node [i] and coordinator to 0
Phase 2: Operational Phase
Input: sensor_node [i] or coordinator
Increment Ci
If Authentication token in sensor_node [i] or coordinator is the first authentication
K:= 10
Create 1st token V:= HK(Seed0 || Ci )
Else
Prev_V= V
V:= HK(Prev_V || Ci ), End if
Decrement K
If K is equal to 0
K:= 10; End_if
If Ci is equal to C_limit
Set Ci to 0
If input is coordinator
Create random Seed0
Broadcast Seed0 to sensor_node [i]
End If
End If
Return (V)
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The above description is for the protocol when utilized in lenient environments. We also
developed the code with the potential of being deployed in harsh environments where more
stringent authentication is desired. We achieve this functionality by determining and presetting
an expiration to the Seed. The expiration could be as simple as a period of time, or after a certain
number of rounds of communication between the coordinator and sensor node. Once the Seed is
updated, the communication count has to be reset to 0.
6.4

Simulation and Evaluation

In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme, we designed a testbed
where the network model described in section 6.2 is depicted. The whole network structure has
been translated in a Java code and run without the authentication protocol. The performance of
the simulated WSN is measured and reported. To test how our scheme impacts the simulated
WSN network, we also wrote a Java code implementing the authentication protocol described in
section 6.3. As a benchmark, we also simulated the authentication scheme if a straightforward
OHC was used. A comparison between these scenarios is made and will be presented in the next
section.
In our simulation, the design consisted of two configurations: serial and parallel
communication. One possible example where the serial mode can be found is in
industry/manufacturing quality control where a product stays on the assembly line for a period of
time and moves from one point to another for different phases of processing. In each phase, there
is a sensor to measure the product temperature and report it to the coordinator. For that purpose,
a set of serial transactions is useful. In this configuration, the coordinator sends a request
message to the first sensor node, and receives a response message from it. Then, the coordinator
sends a request message to the second sensor node, and receives a response message from it, and
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so on until all sensors reply with their data. The coordinator, then, sends the response message to
the mobile device or the quality control manager. In the parallel mode, the coordinator sends a
request message to all sensor nodes at the same time by creating multiple threads. After all
response messages are received, it sends a response message to the mobile device. An example
where parallel configuration is ideal is a medical setting where a physician, for instance, needs to
monitor a patient’s electrocardiogram (EKG) by placing the sensor nodes around the body. Thus,
multiple threads are initiated between the coordinator and sensor nodes.
To measure the effectiveness of our proposed WSN authentication scheme, we used the
following performance metrics in our simulations:
 Time delay: the time was measured based on rounds of communication between the
coordinator and N sensor nodes. Figure 6.2 shows one round of communication for N sensors
in the serial mode. For example a round of communication between the coordinator and sensor
node 1 is the difference between the time that coordinator sends a request message to sensor
node (t1) and receives a response from the sensor node t2. We measured the WSN performance,
in the serial and parallel modes, once without the proposed authentication scheme and another
time when the authentication scheme is plugged either in the OHC or our MOHC format.
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Figure 6-2 Example of time calculation for serial mode
 Average number of hashes: the average number of hash operations performed during a round
of communication. Given the fact that each component of the WSN (coordinator and sensor
nodes) is going to calculate the same number of hashes in each round of communication, we
used an average number of hashes for each of these components and presented comparisons
based on them.
6.5

Performance and Results

In this section, we present the performance evaluation results of our protocol. Let us first
look at how the MOHC protocol performed when compared with the case of no authentication at
all, and with the straightforward OHC. Table 6.1 illustrates the difference in milliseconds
between these three cases in the serial mode. Here, we compared the time in the case of no
authentication, straight forward OHC and our protocol based on the number of rounds of
communication between the coordinator and the sensor nodes. In this case, the coordinator sends
a query to the first sensor node and waits for its response before sending the next request to the
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second sensor node. The results indicate that adding authentication increases the time. This
increase tends to correlate linearly with the duration of the WSN session which is not
unexpected. However, our focus was to compare our idea of mini hash chains on the
performance of WSN with the straightforward implementation of OHC. When the number of
rounds of communication is small, as in the case of 50 rounds, it can be seen that the difference
between OHC and MOHC protocol is approximately 2 milliseconds. However, this difference
becomes more salient with higher rounds of communication numbers. In real WSN traffic,
communication is expected to be higher, and, therefore, rounds of communication number
increases, which makes our solutions an obvious better choice as it outperforms its counterpart
by a margin.
Table 6-1 Time comparisons showing equal execution overheads for MOHC and OHC
(Serial Mode)
Rounds of
communication

NoAuthentication*

OHC*

MOHC*

50

1192

1201

1199

150

2513

2531

2526

300

5011

5047

5029

600

9767

9874

9793

* In milliseconds
Similarly, Table 6.2 summarizes the performance comparison in the parallel mode. As
described above, the coordinator initiates multiple threads to send a request message to all sensor
nodes. The response messages are received in no particular order from the sensor nodes. Here,
we can see the time required to run the simulation without authentication is much less. However,
the time required for authentication, either in the serial or parallel mode, is approximately the
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same. What is important for our comparison is the time difference between OHC and our
MOHC. The difference in time shows our protocol still outperforms the OHC as the table shows.
Table 6-2 Time comparisons showing equal execution overheads for MHOC and OHC
(Parallel Mode)
Rounds of
communication

NoAuthentication*

OHC*

MOHC*

50

297

306

304

150

939

957

951

300

1545

1581

1563

600

3104

3211

3131

* In milliseconds
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Figure 6-3 Time comparisons between OHC and MOHC protocol with higher rounds of
communication (Serial Mode).
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In order to further demonstrate the improvement we achieved in our protocol over OHC,
we measured the time difference between the performance of the two schemes and present it in
Figure 6.3. This figure represents the performance in the serial mode.
As can be seen Figure 6.3, the higher the number of rounds of communication, the wider
the difference margin is. This is another indication that using our MOHC protocol definitely
improves performance and makes deploying a one-way hash chain based protocol more
attractive in WSN.
When the average number of hashes required for a round of communication is compared
as in Figure 6.4, we still can see how our MOHC scheme outperforms the traditional OHC.
Similar to the time delay compared above, as the number of rounds of communication increases,
so does the average hash count. This is indicative of the high computation cost of the one-way
hash chain schemes if configured as is. With minor modifications, like the ones we have
proposed in this chapter, we were able to achieve noticeable improvements. It should be noted
though that regardless of configuration options, the number of hashes is going to be the same.
Each component of the WSN will calculate the same number of hashes.
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Figure 6-4 Average number of hashes comparison between OHC and MOHC
6.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented a mini one-way hash chain based solution for WSN
user and broadcast authentication. Our objective of the proposed solution was to mitigate the
high computational cost of the straightforwardly configured one-way hash chain and avoid
exposing the initial secret. We have shown through simulation and evaluative experiments that
with economic modifications to one-way hash chains, we were able to achieve lower
computational overhead measured by computation time and number of hash operations required
to provide protection. Additionally, by substituting the initial secret with easily computed
authentication tokens, we were able to maintain the initial secret less exposed. We have also
shown that our protocol is attractive form an energy consumption perspective as it lowers
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consumption of sensor nodes’ battery lives. In the future, we plan to improve our solution and
apply it in alternative WSN topologies.
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CHAPTER 7: HYBRID CACHE-SUPPORTED HACH
7.1

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we have proposed four schemes utilizing different configurations
of one-way hash constructions to deliver efficient authentication schemes that are attractive to
developers.

Our main goal has been to achieve efficiency while utilizing the minimum

computing resources possible. In this chapter, we explore the possibility of utilizing the twodimensional HACH equipped with sparse caching capabilities to carry out authentication. While
the scheme is designed with the collaborative and social media network in mind, it can be easily
employed in other environments where session cookies based authentication is used.
7.2

The proposed Hybrid Scheme

We propose a hybrid solution that maximizes efficiency and minimizes the cost of
memory resources. To achieve this, we divide the one-way hash chain into multiple chains and
support them with caching units where authentication tokens are stored and fetched as needed.
To measure efficiency, we use the number of hash operations needed in a session. In the next
section, we define the configuration of the system’s components and determine the cost based on
these configurations. Before this overview is presented, we introduce the notations used in the
scheme. We refer to the proposed scheme as the hybrid scheme.
Scheme Notation
I = mini OHC scheme
J = OHC Caching scheme
K = Hybrid scheme
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Common Notation
N = number of transactions
X = horizontal chain for seeds
Y = vertical chain for authentication tokens
M = space interval between cache units
N=X×Y

// simplified assumption

We will introduce a more detailed description of these notations in our description of the
schemes below.
7.2.1

The mini OHC Scheme:

The conventional OHC scheme has one dimension where one seed is used to generate
authentication tokens by a single one-way hash chain for the whole session. However, the mini
OHC scheme is arranged into two dimensions (see Figure 7.1). In the first dimension (i.e. the
horizontal axis Xi), there is a single hash chain that computes the seeds for the second dimensions
chains (i.e. vertical axis Yi). In the second dimension, we have multiple hash chains that use these
seeds to generate authentication tokens. Authentication tokens are generated by hashing the
seeds using cryptographic hash functions (e.g. SHA-1, SHA-2 or SHA-3). These cryptographic
hash functions are known for their resistance against attacks.
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Figure 7-1 mini OHC Scheme
Authentication in the mini OHC is done in three steps:


Initialization:
The server and the client utilize an HTTPS channel to exchange the number of

transactions in a session N, an initial value of the shared secret S0, and the length of the
authentication token chain Yi. Based on these variables, the number of seeds is determined, and
Seed1 is calculated to be used in the first authentication token chain by applying one-way hash
function on S0.


Authentication:
In this step, the scheme generates the authentication token V at the client side. The

authentication tokens are derived in the vertical chains by applying the one-way hash function on
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Seed1. The authentication token is then attached to the transaction cookie and sent to the server.
A similar authentication routine is done at the server’s side to check the authenticity of the
authentication token. If authentication is verified, the transaction is accepted; otherwise, it will be
rejected. Once the first vertical chain is exhausted, the next routine (i.e. Seed Update) is called to
calculate seeds for the following vertical chain.


Seed Update:
Once the first vertical chain is exhausted, the seed is updated for the next chain by

applying a one-way hash function on the initial S0. Note that each seed is only used in a single
vertical chain to generate authentication tokens for that chain. Furthermore, the authentication
tokens once used are discarded and never used again. As such, the cost of authentication in the
mini OHC scheme is a result of calculating the number of hash operations in the horizontal chain
and the multiple vertical chains. The following is how we calculate the cost of the scheme:
Cost of one vertical chain =

𝑌𝑖 × ( 𝑌𝑖 +1)

( 7.1 )

2

Total cost of all vertical chains = CV = 𝑋𝑖 ×
=𝑁 ×
Cost of the horizontal chain= CH =

𝑌𝑖 × ( 𝑌𝑖 +1)
2
( 𝑌𝑖 +1)
2

𝑋𝑖 × ( 𝑋𝑖 +1)
2

( 7.2 )
( 7.3 )

Total Cost = C = CV + CH
= 𝑁 ×

( 𝑌𝑖 +1)
2

+

𝑋𝑖 × ( 𝑋𝑖 +1)

7.2.2

( 7.4 )

2

The OHC Caching Scheme:

Unlike the previous mini OHC scheme, the OHC caching scheme utilizes storage and
only one-dimension chain, to reduce the computation overhead of the OHC. During the
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initialization step, and in addition to the initial S0 a few authentication tokens are pre-calculated
and stored. Figure 7.2 demonstrates how the cache units are placed for this scheme. The
highlighted blocks are where the authentication tokens are stored. For ease we assume the
interval between caches is one. It should be noted that since we only have one dimension in the
OHC caching scheme, the X parameter is considered the cache size (i.e. number of cache units
utilized). Also, given we do not have vertical chains, we consider Y to be the interval between
cache units. Therefore, Xj= size of cache Yj= interval between two cache units.

Figure 7-2 OHC Caching Scheme
To reiterate, let us revisit an example for a session of 100 transactions authenticated using
the OHC caching scheme. For a session of this size, five storage units (of length 160 bits for
SHA-1) can be reserved. Thus five authentication tokens are calculated in the initial steps and
stored at 20 transaction interval as follows. Note that Xj in this example is 5 and Yj is 20.
cache[0] = s
cache[1] = H20(s),
cache[2] = H40(s),
cache[3] = H60(s),
cache[4] = H80(s).
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Compared to the mini OHC scheme, the OHC with caching has the advantage of low
computation cost. Two important parameters are used to guide the calculation of computation
overhead in the OHC with caching: the cache size Xj and the cache spacing interval Yj. In the
above example, the cache size= 5 and the cache spacing interval= 20. Based on these
assumptions, we can determine the cost of the OHC caching scheme according to the following
formulas:
Cost of authentication tokens between two cache units =
Total Cost = C = 𝑋𝑗 ×

=𝑁 ×

𝑌𝐽 × ( 𝑌𝐽 +1)
2

( 7.5 )

𝑌𝐽 × ( 𝑌𝐽 +1)
2
( 𝑌𝐽 +1)

( 7.6 )

2

It should be noted that the total cost includes the sum of the cost of (Xj-1) ×Yj for the
initial filling of the cache values and a cost of

(𝑋𝑗 −1) × Y× (𝑋𝑗 +1)
2

for the N transactions. Also,

notice that (Xj-1) of the N transactions will not need to perform any hashing since the required
value is already in the cache. For the above example of N = 100 and Xj = 5, transaction # 21 will
simply read V80 from cache[4].
In order to handle more transactions efficiently, we either need to increase the number of
storage units allocations. Or, we have to increase the cache spacing interval.
7.3

HACH Hybrid Scheme

We can alleviate the need for extra storage units and increase efficiency by equipping the
mini OHC with sparse caching components to benefit from the advantages of caching in a twodimensional configuration. Figure 7.3 is a general view of how the hybrid scheme looks with the
caching units added to the mini OHC in the vertical chain Yk. In the Simulation Results Section,
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we discuss why we prefer to equip the scheme with caching at the vertical chain. The highlighted
blocks are where the sparse caching units are placed, and the authentication tokens in these
locations are computed and stored. The proposed scheme uses two dimensions, each of which
generates a set of values. In the first dimension—the horizontal dimension denoted Xk, is a single
one-way hash chain responsible for generating seeds to be used in producing the authentication
tokens in the second dimension Yk—the vertical multiple one-way hash chains.

Figure 7-3 HACH Hybrid Scheme
Here is a high level description of the protocol.
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Initialization:
Xk := N ÷Yk
K:= Yk
J:= Xk
Seed:= HJ(S0)

// length of the Seed_Chain
// K is the global index for the Token_Chain
// J is the global index for the Seed_Chain
// Seed is now Seed1 for the first Token_Chain

Interval:= Yk÷ Cache_Size // # of hash operations between cache units
Call Fill_Cache(Seed)
Fill_Cache (Seed)
Begin
i:= 0
HNum:= 1

// number of hashes to be calculated

While( i not equal to Cache_Size)
Cache[i]:= HM(Seed)

// authentication tokens stored

HNum:= HNum +Interval
i:= i+1
End-While
End
Authentication ( )
Begin
L:= (K/Interval)-1

//L is the cache locator to fetch the token value

HNum:= K-(L*interval)-1
V:= HHNum(Cache[L])
K:= K -1
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if (K==0) then
Update_Seed( )
K:= Yk;
end_if
Return (V);
End
Update_Seed( )
Begin
J := J-1

// J is the global index for the first-tier chain

Seed:= HJ(S0);
Call Fill_Cache(Seed) // update the next authentication tokens
Return (Seed)
End
The protocol is composed of four main procedures: the Initialization, the Authentication,
the Update_Seed and the Fill_Cache (Seed) routines. Each of these routines is responsible for
some part of the protocol.
The Initialization procedure works the same way as described in the mini OHC described
in Section 3. An additional step in the Initialization entails filling the cache with authentication
tokens based on the cache size. This is achieved by invoking the Fill_Cache (Seed) procedure.
The next step is when the session actually starts. It is where authentication tokens are
used to protect session cookies. The Authentication procedure is responsible for generating the
authentication tokens. This step works by locating the closest cache, fetching the respective
stored authentication token and performing the additional hash operations if needed. Once the
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first vertical chain is exhausted, the Update_Seed step is invoked and a new seed is calculated
and handed over to Fill_Cache (Seed) so that authentication tokens for the next Token Chain are
stored. The protocol works in this manner until the session is complete.
Compared to the single dimension OHC caching scheme described in Section 3, where
the number of cache units devised either grows proportionately with the number of transactions,
or is configured to handle more transactions by increasing the cache spacing interval, the hybrid
scheme is more efficient. In other words, to achieve good performance with higher number of
transactions, the OHC caching scheme will need to devise more cache units. In the hybrid
configuration, however, we efficiently handle this scenario, but with much less space by
emptying storage after each Token Chain is exhausted.
While the mini OHC performance is influenced by the length of the Token Chain and the
OHC with caching by the cache size, we need to investigate the optimal configuration of the
hybrid scheme by comparing the costs of the previous two schemes and identifying the factors
that influence the performance. In the following section, we introduce our evaluation of these
factors and present an analytical model to find the best tradeoff between cache employment and
performance.
7.4

Comparison and Tradeoffs

Essentially, using the number of hash operations in a session as a measurement metric,
the mini OHC has higher computation cost as opposed to the OHC caching scheme. The
difference between the two schemes is

𝑋𝑖 × ( 𝑋𝑖 +1)
2

. However, there is the expense of extra storage

units associated with OHC caching scheme. If the number of cache units devised is relatively
small, the performance is comparable. However, if more cache units are added, the OHC caching
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scheme outperforms the mini OHC. Figure 7.4 shows how the two schemes give different
performance for different size of cache for 500 transactions.

30000

OHC Caching
25000

Mini OHC

Total Cost

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
100

50

X

25

5

Figure 7-4 Total Cost of 500 transactions with different x values
In the hybrid scheme, our goal is to utilize the minimum storage requirements while
efficiently handling authentication. First, we present how the total hash cost of the hybrid scheme
is calculated. The analytical model below is used to obtain the optimal setup of the scheme; we
try to achieve a configuration that strikes a balance between efficiency and memory
requirements.
𝑁 = 𝑋𝐾 × 𝑌𝐾

( 7.7 )

Assuming 𝑋𝐾 << 𝑌𝐾 and using the same number of sparse storage units X in the vertical
chains, we get:
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Let Space_Interval 𝑀 =

𝑌𝐾

for simplifying assumption M integer

𝑋𝐾

𝑌𝐾 = 𝑀 × 𝑋𝐾

( 7.8 )

𝑁 = 𝑋𝐾 × 𝑌𝐾 = 𝑀 × 𝑋 2

( 7.9 )

Cost of authentication tokens between 2 cache units =
𝑀× ( 𝑀+1)

Cost of one vertical chain = 𝑋𝐾 ×

2

= 𝑌𝐾 ×

Cost of all vertical chains = CV = 𝑋𝐾 × 𝑌𝐾 ×
Cost of horizontal chain = CH =

( 𝑀+1)
2

𝑀× ( 𝑀+1)

( 7.10 )

2

( 𝑀+1)

( 7.11 )

2

=𝑁 ×

( 𝑀+1)

( 7.12 )

2

𝑋𝐾 × ( 𝑋𝐾 +1)

( 7.13 )

2
( 𝑀+1)

Total Cost = C = CV + CH = 𝑁 ×

2

+

𝑋𝐾 × ( 𝑋𝐾 +1)

( 7.14 )

2
𝑁

The above formula can be used to plot C as a function of N and M where X = √𝑀

C= 0.5𝑁𝑀 + 0.5𝑁 + 0.5

𝑁
𝑀

𝑁

+ 0.5 √𝑀

( 7.15 )

To find the optimal value of M which minimizes the cost C, we differentiate the above
formula with respect to M and equate to 0. On differentiation we have
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑀

= 0.5 𝑁 − 0.5
= 0.5𝑁 − 0.5

𝑁
𝑀2
𝑁
𝑀2

+ 0.5 √𝑁 ( −0.5 𝑀
− 0.25

1
𝑀

−3⁄
2)

𝑁

√

( 7.16 )

𝑀

𝑑𝐶

After equating 𝑑𝑀 to zero, we get the following quartic equation:
4𝑁𝑀4 − 8𝑁𝑀2 − 𝑀 + 4𝑁 = 0

( 7.17 )
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To give an example, the Plot of the function C when the number of transactions is 500 is
given below in Figure 7.5.

Figure 7-5 The minimum value of M when N= 500
Thus, the minimum value occurs near the value M = 1. Table 7-1 summarizes the optimal
values of M for the different numbers of transactions.
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Table 7-1 Optimal values of M
Optimal value of M by
𝒅𝑪

N

equating 𝒅𝑴 = 𝟎

500

1.01118

1000

1.00791

1500

1.00645

2000

1.00559

2500

1.00500

3000

1.00456

Based on the analytical modeling presented above, we can determine the optimal cache
spacing in the hybrid scheme to be 1. Therefore, given the optimal Token Chain length Yk
obtained in [14], we run our simulation with the assumption that the optimal cache spacing is 1.
In the next section the simulation results for the three schemes are presented.
7.5

Simulation and Performance Results

The performance of the HACH hybrid scheme is evaluated using a detailed Java
benchmark. Our goal was to measure the performance of the three schemes. We compared and
contrasted the results measured in terms of efficiency (number of hash operations in a session)
and in terms of storage units required to complete an internet session.
7.5.1

Caching options

The hybrid scheme can benefit from caching in a number of ways. Our first option is to
use caching in the Token Chain Yk. In other words, we only store the authentication tokens or a
subset of them in the vertical dimension of the mini OHC. Caching can be either full or partial.
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In the full caching option, all the authentication tokens are calculated and stored before
authentication, whereas only a subset of authentication tokens are calculated and stored in the
partial caching option. Below is a description of both options.
In the full caching
The number of cache units required is equal to the optimal Token Chain length Yk. Since
all authentication tokens are going to be calculated and stored before the start of the session, the
full caching approach indicates that the authentication tokens do not require any hash operation
in the Yk. The only cost incurred when full caching is utilized would be hash operations used to
derive the seeds in the Xk.
In the partial caching
A subset of authentication tokens in the Token Chain Yk is stored. We use the optimal
cache spacing obtained above (i.e. M = 1) and the optimal Token Chain Yk as the basis for our
spacing. As a result, each authentication token will cost either one hash operation or none (i.e.
fetching the authentication token form the cache). Here is an example to illustrate this:
Suppose we have an Internet session of length 500 transactions. According to [15], the
optimal length of Yk in the mini OHC is 10. The length of Seed Chain Xk is going to be 50.
Cache [0]=H1(S1)
Cache [1]=H3(S1)
Cache [2]=H5(S1)
Cache [3]=H7(S1)
Cache [4]=H9(S1)
Given the number of cache units and the spacing interval, the following are the first ten
authentication tokens along with their cost in terms of hash operations.
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1st Transaction = V1 = H1(Cache [4])
2nd Transaction = V2 = H0(Cache [4])
3rd Transaction = V3 = H1(Cache [3])
…….
10th Transaction = V10 = H0(cache [0])
Therefore, for every Yk only 5 hash operations are required given we have 5 cache units
uniformly distributed. The maximum number of hash operations for the authentication token
transaction is 1 if partial caching with cache spacing of 1 is used.
These caches are used in the first Yk. Once this chain is exhausted, the cache is emptied
and a new seed is generated for the next Yk authentication tokens. New values are calculated and
the cache is filled again with new authentication tokens. If partial caching was used in the OHC
with caching scheme only, we would need 250 memory spaces to carry out an Internet session of
length 500 transactions to achieve comparable results. With adding partial sparse caching to the
mini OHC, we can bring this number down to just 5 memory spaces.
7.5.2

Full vs. Partial Caching Performance

Figure 7.6 demonstrates the session cost measured by the number of hashes in the full
caching configuration and the partial caching operation. We perform this test when caching is
only performed at the Token Chain Yk. Later, we test the caching option in the Seed Chain Xk.
Here we can see that the full caching does not have a tremendous improvement over partial
caching.
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Figure 7-6 Session cost comparison between full and partial caching in g in Y
Thus, the next step is to compare the storage requirements in the full and partial caching
configurations in the Token Chain Yk to see whether it is worth to employ full caching or partial
caching. The comparison is presented in Figure 7.7. While the partial caching requires half the
storage of the full caching, it can still achieve good results. Therefore, the partial caching can be
a better option as the memory requirement is half without sacrificing performance.
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Figure 7-7 Storage requirement comparison between full and partial caching
7.5.3

Performance Comparison between the three schemes

Since the partial caching option strikes a good balance between memory requirement and
efficient performance, we compare the performance of the hybrid scheme in the partial caching
option at the Token Chain Yk with the HACH caching scheme and the mini HACH scheme.
Table 7.2 summarizes the results of this comparison. Note that we use the same number of cache
units in the simulation of each scenario except for mini HACH where caching is not supported.
In terms of efficiency, the mini HACH scheme helps reduce the session cost significantly if
compared to the HACH scheme. By utilizing very little storage in the hybrid scheme, we were
able to lower this cost by approximately 65% as indicated in the table.
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Table 7-2 Comparing session cost between the three schemes
Number of

mini

Hybrid

HACH

HACH

HACH
Transactions

7.6

500

25250

4025

1525

1000

71930

10009

3465

1500

141382

12505

5750

2000

251000

24875

8875

2500

348471

33496

10980

Caching in Token Chain Yk or Seed Chain Xk

Our next task is to see whether equipping the proposed scheme with caching capabilities
in both dimensions can have better outcome. Figure 7.8 and 7.9 demonstrate the storage and
session cost requirements if either the Seed Chain or the Token Chain is equipped with caching
capabilities. It is obvious that adding caching in the Seed Chain does not benefit the scheme as
storage requirement increases (Figure 7.8) while the session cost increases (Figure 8.9).
Therefore, we have opted for equipping the hybrid scheme with sparse caching at the Token
Chain to be the optimal setup.
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Figure 7-8 Storage requirement comparison with cache support in either Token_Chain
(Y) or Seed_Chain (X)
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Figure 7-9 Session cost comparison with cache support in either Token_Chain (Y) or
Seed_Chain (X)
7.7

Conclusion

This chapter addresses the security threat of session hijacking attacks facing collaborative
applications especially when mobile and wireless applications are utilized to access collaborative
services. Common HTTPS based solutions do not usually suit mobile devices especially those
with limited computation and storage capacities. One-way hash chain based solutions have been
proposed to replace the current cookie based session management techniques but due to their
inherent nature requiring recursive computation of hash values, they do not suit some mobile
devices. This is particularly because of the high computational overhead associated with OHC in
Internet session.
This chapter proposed and analyzed the potential of a hybrid solution where divided oneway hash chains are equipped with caching capacities to store pre-computed hashed values and
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fetch them once needed to authenticate a user session. We presented an analytical model which
aimed at measuring the cost of the hybrid scheme compared to the straightforward HACH with
caching and the two-dimensional HACH. We also used this analysis to derive a quartic equation
with which we were able to identify the optimal cache spacing configuration in the hybrid
scheme. The evaluation and experimentation reveal major improvements and highlight
advantage of adding sparse caching to the mini one-way hash chains to achieve economic and
efficient authentication for mobile devices that suits collaborative applications and other Internet
applications.
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CHAPTER 8: IMPROVED AUTHENTICATION IN SINGLE SIGN-ON
ENVIRONMENT AND RFID IN TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
8.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we propose an authentication scheme tailored for the growing SSO
environment. Our scheme relies on the utilization of hash calendars and Merkle Hash trees in
addition to HACH to provide for a keyless signature environment. Our main motivation for
adopting a keyless signature scheme is that the majority of SSO schemes that suffer from
impersonation attacks rely heavily on public/private key cryptosystems to achieve their
authentication. Our goal is to add rigor and robustness to current SSO systems without
sacrificing functionality and effectiveness.
8.2

Problem Statement

Before we provide a formal definition of the authentication problem in SSO, let us
introduce the typical components of SSO systems and their functionalities. Figure 8.1 depicts the
SSO overall architecture. As can be seen in the figure, the communication and authentication of
the SSO follows the steps illustrated. In the first step, a client requests a URI (unified resource
identifier) from a service provider. Second, the service provider contacts an identity provider,
who manages and delegates authentication in the scheme, to check if the client holds the required
authentication privileges (an active user session established via the exchange of user’s
credentials), and, if not, asks the user to create one and provide it to the identity provider. If the
user provides the necessary authentication credentials, the identify provider provides the
requesting services provider and the other participating service providers with authentication
assertion that entail that the user is a verified one.
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Figure 8-1 SSO overall structure
The authors of [95] indicate that the main cause of SSO impersonation attacks are related
to the design of the communication channel between the service providers and the identity
provider which lacks bi-directional authentication. In fact, the SAML 2.0 specification
repeatedly indicate that the communication between the client, who is typically a browser guided
by a user, and the SP is carried over a unilateral SSL connection. Similarly, the communication
between the client and the SP starts as a unilateral SSL connection and becomes bilateral once
the client is authenticated through the exchange of valid certificates from the IdP and appropriate
credentials from the clients. These two assumptions are, according to [51], problematic due to
two essential reasons: 1) the lack/ambiguity of authentication recentness which is a logical
requirement in any authentication scheme, and 2) the unidirectional nature of authentication
between the SP and the client. As far the first reason is concerned, the SAML 2.0 specification
states that the SP and client mutually authenticate and agree on the value of URI, but fails to
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guarantee whether this assertion is recent or not. This feature is particularly important given the
fact that the SAML 2.0 protocol does not guarantee authentication to be carried out using a
single SSL connection. Due to difficulties pertaining to the nature of SSL such as the difficulty
to resume an already established connection after it has been terminated, it is natural to assume
that SAML 2.0 protocol is carried out using different SSL connections. Therefore, the recentness
of authentication assertion is not possible to achieve unless the protocol is run with each run of
the SSL connection, which is necessarily against the whole nature of SSO. In terms of the second
reason, the SAML 2.0 does not provide the client with guarantees of the authenticity of the SP’s
after he/she has been granted access by the IdP. Similar problems have also been detected in the
OpenID environment.
The lack of recentness of the SSL protocols utilized in the SSO environment and the unidirectional nature of the SSO schemes makes it possible for a malicious SP to impersonate a
client and cause it to access certain resources without its consent. Therefore, it is imperative for
any authentication scheme to be suitable for SSO to satisfy these requirements in addition to the
common authentication requirements.
8.3

The Proposed SSO Authentication Scheme

Our main goal in this paper is to develop a solution that efficiently handles the security of
SSO. In the proposed protocol, we pay special attention to the possible causes of certain SSO
vulnerabilities. From a cryptographic point of view, access to the SSO requires the service
providers, clients as well as identity providers to carry their communication based on public and
private keys as seen in the majority of the schemes discussed in the Literature Review Chapter of
this dissertation. The security of the whole environment is contingent upon these keys. If for any
reason these keys are compromised, there is the risk of stolen identities, password revocation and
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their likes. In this chapter, we propose a keyless signature scheme that is based on utilizing a
hash calendar and Merkle Hash Trees in addition to our HACH protocol. In Table 8.1, we
introduce the notations used in the chapter.
Table 8-1 Keyless SSO Scheme Notations
Symbol Description
Idp

The central Identity Provider

C

An SSO client

SPs

List of Service Providers

K

Length of one-way hash chain to generate authentication tokens

Seed

Secret value dispensed by SP to C to be used in V

N

The activity between client's login and logout

V

Authentication Token

H()

One way hash function

CO

The total computational cost during N
Computational cost in SSL connection when Seed is exchanged

I
between C and SP
8.3.1

Adversary Model

We summarize the adversary model envisioned in the current scheme in the following
steps. Steps of the attack involving a malicious service provider, which can be conducted by
malicious code insertion:
1. C contacts a malicious SP (thinking it’s an honest SP) requesting a URI
2. Impersonating C, the malicious SP relays the request received from C to an honest SP
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3. The honest SP replies to the malicious SP to authenticate himself to IdP.
4. The malicious SP relays the authenticate message to C.
5. C communicates with IdP through HTTPS for authentication and provide its credentials.
6. IdP provides C with authentication assertions to be sent to SP.
7. SP receives C’s authentication assertions and set cookies for further communication.
8. When C tries to access a service at SP and provides session cookies, the malicious SP
will steal the cookies because the connection is in http.
9. Malicious SP will freely use services at SP as long as cookies are active.
Let us before describing the details of our keyless protocol touch on the concepts of
Merkle hash trees and hash calendars.
8.3.2 Merkle Hash Trees
A Merkle hash tree is a binary tree whose leaf nodes are pieces of data. Neighboring
nodes are concatenated and hashed. The resulting hash value is the first level of the tree. An
example of a Merkle Hash Tree is shown in Figure 8.2. At lowest level of the tree, we have the
data that is hashed and placed in a leaf node.
Let us now explain how authentication is conducted in a Merkle Hash Tree. At the lowest
level of the tree, the values of the eight leaf nodes are calculated by applying a hash function h(i)
=h(Ti)(i = 1, . . . , 8), where T is a piece of data. At the tree nodes level, the internal nodes are
derived from their child nodes. For example, the value of the node h3,4 = h(h3||h4) and so on until
we reach the root node h1,8=h(h1,4||h5,8). To verify the authenticity of a node, the leaf nodes can
be authenticated with the root node h1,8 and the corresponding authentication path information.
For example, to verify the node T1, the server, in which h1,8 (the root) is stored, checks the
information sent from T1 (which also includes the corresponding authentication path information
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= h2, h3,4, h5,8). The server first computes and h1, then h1,2 = h(h1||h2), h1,4 = h(h1,2||h3,4), and last,
h1,8 = h(h1,4||h5,8). In the last step, the server checks whether the computed h1,8 corresponds to the
existing h1,8. The server only accepts the data from T1, only if the two values are matching.
Our utilization of the Merkle hash tree does not only involve authentication of data as
explained above. Rather, we use it to generate a value that constitutes the SSO key. As will be
shown later in this section, the Merkle hash tree construction enables us to periodically update
this key.

Figure 8-2 Merkle hash tree
8.3.3

Hash Calendars

The authors of [62] indicate that a hash calendar as a special type of a hash tree with leaf
nodes representing every second since 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC. As such, at any given
moment, the tree has a leaf node for each second starting from this time. The structure of the tree
starts from left to right and each leaf node added is added to the right. They describe several
ways the tree can be structured and hash chains for individual seconds are extracted from it. One
such construction is as follows:
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The tree is built with maximal number of nodes and the nodes representing future
seconds are left empty as in Figure 8.3. In this particular figure, we have a tree for 11 seconds.
Instead of the regular concatenation and hashing in a typical Merkle tree the, the empty nodes
(grey nodes) are merged and copied to the next level. In case there is one empty node and
another non-empty node, the non-empty node is copied to the next level (dashed lines).
Therefore, in the chain extraction process, the copying processes are not included and only the
copied nodes are used for the chain extraction.

Figure 8-3 Hash calendar structure
The authentication mechanism using the hash calendar is to a great extent similar to that
of the Merkle Hash Trees. That is the authentication is achieved by using two pieces of
information: 1) the authentication path information and the root hash. The hash calendar is
originally proposed to perform timestamping functionality [62] that is verifiable if needed. The
root hash of the hash calendar is calculated at a certain point and published via easily accessible
media. In our proposed scheme, we employ the hash calendar not only to provide timestamping,
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but also to produce the authentication key. The published root is used as a key to verify the
authenticity of the communicating parties. More importantly, the root is updated periodically to
ensure recentness of the authentication key. In our proposed scheme, we employ the hash
calendar in a two-phase manner to produce the authentication key. The published root is used as
a key to verify the authenticity of the communicating parties. More importantly, the root is
updated periodically to ensure recentness of the authentication key.
8.3.4

SSO Keyless Signature Scheme Components

In this section, we introduce the main components of the proposed scheme and their
roles.


Identity provider: the identity provider handles authentication and provides
authentication assertions to the service providers and clients. The identity provider
keeps track of a hash calendar which is pre-calculated and updated periodically (in the
following step we will show when the hash calendar is updated), in addition to
registering each log in by the client in a hash tree.



The client: the first communication between the client and the identity provider
involves the creation and exchange of authentication credentials (a user name, and a
password). This step can be SSL/TSL secured. The first log in and each subsequent log
in are used as input for the hash tree. Once the root of the hash tree is calculated, the
root of the two trees are concatenated and hashed to produce the new key for the
scheme.



The service provider: like the client, the service provider contacts the identity provider
to verify and get authentication assertions with reference to a certain client. Traffic
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between the SP and C is secured by using a one-way hash chain which is meant to
produce a bidirectional authentication channel.
The identity provider is responsible for updating the hash trees and the hash calendar.
Each time the hash calendar is updated, the root value is handed over to the service providers and
the client as the fresh key for authentication. The key acts as a benchmark to validate the
communication between nodes. So, instead of sharing a public key between clients and servers
and utilizing private keys, the privacy of which is critical to the network, the key is used for
verification of authenticity of the communicating nodes. As such, if a malicious service provider
or client tries to get a hold of a client’s credentials, they would need to have an updated and fresh
version of the key.
8.3.5

SSO Authentication Procedure

In this section, we provide a formal description of our SSO authentication procedure. The
following is a pseudo code:
C sends register request to Idp
HashCalendar[C] ← Idp initializes a hash calendar for C

(*)

Idp publish hash root to C and SPs

(**)

C sends a request to an URI at SP[i]
Idp verifies that C has permission to access URI by receiving a request from SP[i].
LogIn (C, SP[i]) ← Idp authenticate if C is allowed to access URI at SP[i]
Add LogIn(C, SP[i]) to a hash tree

(*)

If the hash tree of C is complete
Calculate new hash root

(*)

Append hash root to HashCalendar[C]

(*)
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Idp publish hash root to C and SPs

(**)

SP[i] verifies C is valid and not malicious
If the hash root matches
Session[C] ← Active session for C
SP[i] Generate Seed and send it along with K to C
Transaction Authentication[C] ←Verify C’s transaction
V← Hk(Seed)

(*)

Decrement K

(*)

If K is equal to 0
Update Seed

(*)

Reseat K

(*) Computation Overhead is measured
(**) Communication Overhead is measured
As the code above shows, the SSO authentication scheme is composed of two main
routines; one is done at eh IdP side and the other is conducted at the SP side. While the goal of
the routine at the IdP is to generate the SSO key (i.e. the hash value of the hash calendar and the
hash tree) which satisfies the recent key requirement explained in section 2, the SP routine
satisfies the unidirectional authentication requirement by utilizing and adapting our HACH
scheme. In the following, we provide more explanation:
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Routine at the Idp:
1. A client wants to access a service (URI) at an SP
2. SP checks with IdP to see if C is a registered client. If yes go to step 3 and, if not do the
following:
a. IdP returns to C for creating an account.
b. Once the account is created, the IdP generates the hash root using a hash
calendar and publishes to the client and SPs.
c. IdP initializes a hash tree and registers the first log in in the tree.
3. IdP checks if C is logged in:
a. If yes, go to step 1 in the second routine (routine at SP).
b. Otherwise, Idp requests C login information and add login info to the hash tree.
4. Once the hash tree is complete a new hash root is calculated and used as a new hash
root.
Routine at the SP:
Each SP handles authentication independently by running the following routine (this
routine prevents impersonation attacks):
1. After C tries to access a URI at SP, SP checks with IdP, which runs the first routine for
authentication.
2. If there is an active log in, the SP requests the hash root from C. If it matches hash root
at SP, a new session starts.
a. SP generates and sends a Seed to be used in Transaction Authentication routine,
along with the chain length K to C.
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b. Each communication between C and SP is secured by authentication tokens
generated by Transaction Authentication routine. If token V that came from C
matches the stored one at SP, the transaction is accepted.
c. If session is exhausted the Seed is updated for the next authentication tokens.
4. Continue session until C logs out, or session terminates for lack of authentication.
Session termination causes:
Session termination requires the client to log in again: These can be changed depending
on application needs:
1. Lack of authentication during an active session: when the client or SP fails to provide a
current authentication token, the session terminates automatically and the user is required
to log in again.
2. Time constraints: the user has been idle for a specific amount of time during an active
session.
3. Changing machine: when the user logs in to the SSO using a different machine, the
session in the first machine automatically terminates.
4. Changing connections: using a wireless connection that converts to an LTE connection
requires the user to log in again.
8.4

Performance evaluation

This section introduces the performance evaluation and testing. We first introduce the
testbed that was used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme.
8.4.1

Performance evaluation testbed

In order to evaluate the proposed SSO authentication scheme, a simulation based testbed
was designed and developed. The simulator simulates communication between the components
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described in section 4.4. The simulator functions as follows: 1) the simulator generates a number
of requests for each client, and simulates the operation of the identity provider to record the
communication overhead, computation overhead and number of hash operations in order to
estimate the efficiency and performance of the simulated SSO authentication scheme. We
provide more description of these metrics below.
8.4.2

Evaluation Metrics

The simulation is measured by counting each of measurement factors based on the logic
of the authentication scheme. As such, the simulation records these following metrics which we
use as our main evaluation metrics of the scheme:
•

Communication Overhead is the number of communications required for the
authentication scheme for services at service providers made by the client. The
communication overhead entails communication between the client and the IdP in
addition to communication between the client and SP’s. Each of these overheads is
measured separately.

•

Computation Overhead is the number of computations required by the authentication
scheme. Computation involves the creation and updating of the key from the IdP, in
addition to the creation and update of the Seed at the SP’s. This involves the hashing
operations required to generate and update these variables.
The performance evaluation was run to find out the performance of the authentication

scheme over a number of variables. The first configuration was when we varied the number of
times a client logs in to the SSO. Second, we measured performance over variable number of
service providers with fixed number of log ins. We then measure the optimal length of the oneway hash chain responsible for authenticating traffic between the client and SP’s.
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8.4.3

The Effect of Number of Log ins

The first test run to evaluate the SSO authentication scheme was when the number of log
ins was varied. This number was set at 10 service providers. The graph in Figure 8.4 shows the
existence of a linear relation between the authentication scheme performance over increasing
number of log ins in terms of communication overhead. This is not surprising, as it is intuitive to
have an increase in communication, computation overheads as well as the number of hash
operations.
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Figure 8-4 Communication Overhead over Variable Number of Log ins
The number of log ins also has a an effect on the computational overhead of the scheme.
In Figure 8.5, this overhead shows that the more log ins we have, the higher the computational
overhead incurred.
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Figure 8-5 Computational Overhead with Variable Number of Log ins
8.4.4

Variable Number of Service Providers

The second evaluation environment was when the number of service providers increased.
We increased the number of service providers incrementally by 10 until we simulated the
authentication scheme’s performance at 50 service providers. Note that we fix the number of log
ins in this test at 8. The reason is that based on the previous two tests, 8 log ins appeared to have
the least effect on both communication and computation. Figure 8.6 demonstrates the overhead
in this setting. Similarly, Figure 8.7 shows the computation overhead with the different number
of service providers.
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Figure 8-6 Communication Overhead with Variable Number of Service Providers
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Figure 8-7 Computation Overhead with Variable Number of SPs
The main reason why this occurred is that each service provider is expected to compute
the same number of hashes during the run of the authentication scheme. In other words, the work
load is distributed equally among the service providers involved. In real life scenarios, this would
be different, as the client might not use the services equally.
8.4.5

Optimal Token Chain Length in HACH

Although the computation and communication overheads seemed to be influenced by the
increasing number of log ins and service providers, the length of K, which is the one-way hash
chain length, appeared to have an unpredictable influence on the computation overhead at the
SP’s sides. More precisely, neither did the length of this chain yield a linearly increasing
computation, nor did it lead to a decreasing effect. For that reason, we developed an analytical
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model in which we derived an approximate optimal length of K by computing the cost of the
HACH scheme at the SP.
In order to find this value, we had to account for the computations involved in the
initialization and update of the Seed in an active Client/SP session. This cost is measured by
adding the cost of the initial Seed generation, the hash operations to authenticate the traffic and
the Seed updating once this chain is exhausted. While this cost is highly dependent on the
number of transactions between the SP and C, which we gave a value of N in our notation Table
8.1, the Seed generation and update, which are done using an SSL based connection for which
we used I in Table 8.1. Whereas N depends on users’ behavior and differs from one application
to another and, therefore, cannot be determined, we investigated the available literature to find an
approximate cost of the SSL. The authors of [96] indicate that SSL is typically achieved through
the SSL handshake protocol that usually involves three essential phases: 1) parameter
negotiation, 2) mutual authentication and 4) secret key exchange. With this in mind, they
measured the performance overload of SSL and found that approximately 80% of time is spent in
SSL handshake and encryption/ decryption. Moreover, the authors of [97] analyzed SSL
processing and found that about 70% of the total processing time of an HTTPS is spent in SSL
processing. While computation cost of SSL is largely influenced by computing resources, an
approximation can be made based on these statistics. In [97], they calculated the execution cost
of the AES for key sizes of 128 and 256 and found them to be 562 and 747 cycles, respectively.
For our derivation of the optimal chain length, we use both of these numbers for the different key
sizes. Here is how we obtain the optimal length of K:
𝐶𝑂 = (

𝐾×(𝐾+1)
2

𝑁

+ 𝐼) × 𝐾

( 8.1)
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𝐶𝑂 =

𝑁𝐾+𝑁
2

+

𝐼𝑁

( 8.2)

𝐾

We Differentiate the above formula with respect to K and equate to 0.
𝜕𝐶𝑂
𝜕𝐾
𝑁
2

=

𝑁

𝐼𝑁

− 𝐾2
2

( 8.3 )

𝐼𝑁

− 𝐾2 = 0

( 8.4 )

𝐾 2 = 2𝐼

( 8.5 )

𝐾 = √2𝐼

( 8.6 )

We use this equation to plot the optimal value of K for 1500 transactions. Figure 8.8
demonstrates that the optimal value of k if an SSL key of either size 128 or 256 bits obtained by
simulation. These are around 33 and 38 respectively. This means that the Seed needs to be
updated approximately every 33, 38 transactions to achieve optimal performance depending on
the AES key size used in the SSL connection.
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8.5

Tree-based Authentication for Toll/Traffic Management Systems

After introducing our SSO authentication scheme, we devote this section of the chapter
for an equally important context that requires rigorous authentication, namely, the context of
Toll/Traffic management systems. We propose the utilization of a modified Merkle hash tree
structure for better handling of RFID authentication in this particular context.
Existing RFID schemes targeting traffic management contexts are mainly conceptual and
prototypical. Little attention has been given to the important issue of authentication. With the
rapid migration to cloud-based technology, there is a pressing urgency for addressing
authentication in toll/ traffic RFID solutions. We introduce a toll/ traffic RFID authentication
scheme which benefits from the well-known Merkle hash trees. The main benefit of MHTs is its
scalability compared to traditional schemes. In order to increase scalability, we propose a scheme
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that significantly lowers the computation complexity of the traditional MHTs. In our proposed
scheme, we achieve practical performance and improve traditional MHTs by a simple division
mechanism. Initial evaluation results demonstrate these benefits and show promising direction
for further research.
8.6

Problem Statement

A traditional RFID system is composed of three main components: RFID tags, RFID
readers and a back-end server. The RFID readers, which are usually able to read multiple tags
simultaneously, send encrypted radio signals interrogating RFID tags. The RFID tags in turn
respond with their identification information along with the data relative to the application in
which they are applied. For a road management RFID scheme, the main goal is to achieve
Automatic Vehicle Identification (AVI). According to [98], AVI permits fully automatic and
unique identification of vehicles at specific interrogation points and offers potential benefits in
many fields such as fleet control, revenue collection, traffic operations, transportation planning,
and safety and law enforcement. While primitive AVI techniques were based on technologies
such as microwave and other dated technologies, more reliance on modern technologies such as
RFID has become more common in recent systems.
Conventionally, RFID readers send, via radio signals, interrogative commands to RFID
tags, which in turn respond with the interrogated information. Before this process of data
transmission is incepted, an authentication process verifying the identity of the reader and the
authenticity of the tags is conducted. During this process, both entities perform the security
parameters set forth by the protocols deployed in the system. The reader first sends a nonce
message to activate the RFID tags. The tags verify the identity of the readers by checking the
readers’ stored information. If verified, the tags respond with an encrypted message which
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contains its identification information so that the reader verifies their authenticity. If this
verification process is successful, the reader responds with more information containing queries
about the data to be gathered.
Most authentication solutions addressing this scenario fall into two major categories:
server-based solutions and server-less solutions. The authors of [99] point out that most RFID
authentication schemes available in the literature (e.g. [69], [75]) are either backend-server-based
or server-less (e.g. [100] and [101]). On the one hand, schemes utilizing backend servers entail
communication between the RFID readers and the backend server to carry out the operation of
the schemes. Essentially, readers transmit data which they gather from RFID tags to the backend
servers which in turn verify the authenticity of the readers and tags according to their databases.
This constant transmission of data back and forth with the backend server necessities the
existence of communication channels between the readers and the backend servers throughout
the connection, presenting an authentication problem. Essentially, authentication in these
schemes typically targets the channels between the readers and the RFID tags.
The other category of RFID schemes is the server-less based solutions. Server-less RFID
architectures are designed so that readers identify tags offline. While this alleviates the need for
connecting to external resources via wireless connections, the readers are required to have an AL
(Access List) downloaded from a CA (Certification Agency). Such solutions typically suffer
from low scalability due to the limited capacities of the reader. In addition, they are known for
their low privacy preservation due to the potential of readers to be tampered with either
physically or via hacking.
Evolving trends in RFID solutions involve migration to cloud-based environments to
further enhance their abilities, adding new challenging dimensions to the already complicated
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authentication mechanisms. Neither server-based RFID schemes nor server-less schemes
authentication cover the full spectrum of authentication requirements for a cloud-based RFID
system. Therefore, our proposed authentication scheme tailored for cloud-based RFID with the
traffic/road toll context as a basis of our scheme utilizes a Merkle hash tree to achieve
authentication.
8.7

The Proposed RFID Authentication Scheme

Assuming there are several proposed schemes to address authentication between the
readers and tags in conventional RFID schemes, the proposed scheme will be more focused on
authenticating the communication between the RFID reader and the cloud server in the traffic
and toll management/payment context.
Figure 8.9 is a high level depiction of the proposed scheme to solve the authentication
problem between the RFID readers and the cloud server utilizing Merkle hash trees (MHT). The
basic idea of the MHT scheme is that each node in the tree is a hash function derived by the
computation of its children. Two pieces of information are important in the MHT scheme,
namely the root node and the authentication path information (API). When the reader reads a tag,
it will submit the tag’s data along with the API. To ensure the authenticity of the node sending
the data, the API is used to calculate the root node, and if the calculated root node matches the
stored root node, the authenticity of the data source is verified. By doing this we can ensure
authentication from the reader’s direction. To ensure the data stored in the cloud is confidential,
the data to be sent to the cloud is going to be encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) for instance. Thus, T1 would be the Tag ID and the encrypted data.
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Figure 8-9 Cloud-based RFID tree system
In order to avoid the exponential growth of MHT’s if the number of the tags increases,
we can set an upper bound on the tree size, thereby reducing computational overhead.
Depending on the number of tags, we will have multiple trees each with a unique ID. Each
reading of the tags will be accompanied by the corresponding tree ID. For example, if we have a
tree with 16 leaf nodes and we need to authenticate a piece of data sent from the reader to the
server with API, we only need 4 hash operations to calculate the root node to see if it matches the
stored one. By doing so, not only do we aim to lower the computation overhead incurred by the
reading and authentication of tags, but we should be able to decrease the size of authentication
tree making the search less expensive to perform by the reader. If a reader performs a search
within a tree of size 16 as opposed to a tree of size N, where N is the total number of tags in the
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database, the search complexity is lowered tremendously. This is especially beneficial in the
context of traffic management and toll payment systems, where the readers typically have one
chance of reading the RFID tags (i.e. when the vehicle passes through the toll gate at high
speeds).
8.8

Protocol Components and performance

Commonly, RFID schemes are composed of three main components: 1) RFID tags, 2)
RFID readers and 3) a back-end server, in case it is server-based. Our proposed scheme shares
these components but instead of a back-end server owned by the company or a third party known
to the respective service provider, we use the cloud as a back-end server. In this case, we aim to
secure the communication not only on the readers and RFID tags side but also on the direction
between the readers and the cloud. For that reason, the communication between the readers and
the cloud is secured by the utilizing the AES protocol which is known for its security and
robustness against different types of attacks. We chose AES despite its relatively high cost due to
its strength and to the fact that the reader and the cloud can afford its high computation since
both are well equipped with storage and powerful resources. In the RFID tags direction,
however, and since they typically are much less powerful, as they are usually not capable of
performing highly complex algorithms such as AES, we use a Merkle hash tree as depicted in
Figure 8.2 (for more information about how authentication is achieved using a Merkle hash tree,
please refer to section 8.3.2).
Given the nature of the toll/ traffic management scenario described in the introduction of
this problem statement section, which necessitates RFID readers to identify tags on the go at
vehicles’ highway speeds, searching the whole tree to identify a certain RFID tag upon the
passage of a vehicle in the readers’ range can be cumbersome. As such, an MHT like this does
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not provide scalability. That is because when the tree grows to accommodate more RFID tags,
the readers’ ability to search the tree to find the appropriate tag becomes difficult, thereby
increasing the potential of denial of service attacks. Our proposed scheme addresses this issue by
splitting the authentication tree into multiple smaller trees, each with its unique tree ID and its
own set of RFID tags.
8.9

Performance Evaluation

In order to show the benefit of the proposed scheme, we show comparisons between the
performance of one large MHT as opposed to multiple smaller MHTs. Let us first demonstrate
how we calculate the cost of a single MHT in the following:
Number of RFID tags( Leaf nodes)= N = 2i
Number of hash operations to authenticate one RFID tag = i-1
Number of hash operations to authenticate all RFID tags with one MHT= N*(i-1)
This formula is used to determine the cost of authentication in one tree. Note that we use
the number of hash operation in a session as an indicator of the cost. Therefore, our main goal is
to reduce this cost as much as possible. The computation cost of multiple hash trees is
determined according to the following formula:
Using multiple hash trees(MMHT) with a maximum size of k leaf nodes:
Number of MHT=M =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝐹𝐼𝐷 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑠(𝑁)
𝑘

Number of RFID tags (Leaf nodes) in one MHT= k = 2j
Number of hash operations to authenticate one RFID tag= j-1
Number of hash operations to authenticate all RFID tags in MMHT= M*k*(j-1)

153

Before presenting the comparison results, let us look at how the branching factor
influnces the performance of the protocol. Figures 8.12 and 8.13 below demonstrate how the size
of the tree impacts the number of hash operations when the numer of RFID tags in the system is
60,000. If we set the tree size at 32, we will end up having 1800 MHTs with in which 240,000
hash operations are required. Conversely, increasing the MHT size increases the number of hash
operations slightly, with a much reduced number trees. For an MHT of 128 nodes, we will have
469 trees with a hash cost of 360,000. With an MHT of 64 nodes, we have 938 trees with a hash
cost of 300,000.
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Figure 8-10 Impact of number of nodes on MHTs
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Figure 8-11 Impact of the tree size on hash count
Based on these results, we opted for the MHT size that yields the lowest number of
hash operations (i.e. 32) to compare the performance of the proposed protocol with traditional
MHT based solutions. In figures 8.14 and 8.15, we show the comparison results. The results
below are the comparison of performance of one MHT versus multiple MHTs with 32 leaf node.
The performance comparison assumes the whole dataset is to be authenticated. To authenticate a
single tag, we will need only 4 hash operations as Figure 8.15 demonstrates.
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As the comparison results demonstrate in figure 8.14, the divided MHT and the single
MHT achieve similar performances when the number of tags in the network is small (i.e. 10,000
RFID tags in the experiment). Earlier this chapter, we have shown that toll/traffic management
systems typically have a large number of vehicles and that networks constantly grow in size
which means that the RFID tags to be authenticated is much higher. The results indicate that our
proposed scheme achieves much lower computation as the number of tags increases when
compared to traditional MHT based solutions.
8.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a keyless authentication scheme designed to suit multiserver authentication environments where single-sign on is adopted. Most previous schemes
available in the literature suffer from the lack of bi-directional authentication channels between
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service providers and clients. In addition, the fact that authentication can occur utilizing multiple
SSL connection requires the authentication keys used to remain constant resulting in the lack of
recentness of the keys.
The scheme presented in this paper addresses these issues by proposing the utilization of
hash calendars and hash trees to derive authentication keys that can be bi-directionally verified
and constantly changing to insure recentness. The proposed scheme was exposed to extensive
experiments to measure communication, computation overheads and the total number of hash
operations required to carry out the scheme. We also developed an analytical model to derive the
optimal configuration of the one-way hash chain used for authentication between the client and
service providers.
Also in this chapter, we explored the possibility and benefit of utilizing the Merkle hash
tree construction to develop an RFID based solution for authenticating RFID tags in toll/traffic
management environment. Due to the high cost associated with MHTs especially with large
networks of RFID tags such as the case of toll/traffic management systems, traditional MHTs do
not provide scalability. Therefore, we have proposed dividing the MHT into multiple trees to
better handle environments like toll/traffic systems where ID identification is needed on the go at
highway speeds. We have shown through comparison that the proposed RFID scheme
outperforms the traditional MHT based protocols. The improvement in performance is much
more significant as the number of RFID tags in the network increases. In our future work, we
will focus on determining the ideal size of the tree and the optimal branching factor.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The research in this dissertation has thus far shed some light on seven schemes that have
been proposed to address the problem authentication in a variety of environments. In particular,
we proposed five schemes to solve the computational overhead associated with one-way hash
chain constructions when used to protect session cookies in HTTP connections as well as
broadcast and user authentication in wireless sensor networks. In addition, it has introduced a
novel solution to tackle the drawback of the uni-directional authentication channel and lack of
key recentness in multi-server environments that utilize single sign-on mechanisms by
employing a combination of a hash calendar, Merkle hash trees and one-way hash chains.
Finally, an authentication scheme tailored for the context of toll/traffic management RFID
systems was introduced.
Session cookies are one of the widely used mechanisms to keep browser state between
the client and the server. They are, therefore, commonly used to substitute users’ identity in
Internet sessions as a cheaper alternative to the wide utilization of the secure HTTPS protocol or
SSL/TSL based mechanisms which tend to be expensive and incur additional costs that service
providers prefer to spare for other expenses. One of the major drawbacks of such practice is the
fact that session cookies are stored and communicated in plaintext, thereby exposing critical
private information about the user and about the services being used during that session. One
common threat resulting from this practice is the hijacking of session cookies and other
identifiers that belong to the user.
Much of the research addressing the issue of session hijacking is very much preliminary
and up to this point the majority of session cookies are communicated in the air without proper
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protection. A major recent security breach has resulted in exposing of critical financial and
banking information of more than 40 million customers who have shopped at Target Stores in
the United States during the months of November and December of 2013 [102]. Although it is
early to determine whether this breach can be attributed to hijacking session cookies or not, the
author of [102] suspects the incident took place because of debit personal identification numbers
interception process that targeted the giant Target retailer stores. In a different incident, the
author of [103] talks about an attacker who claims he was able to steal session cookies pertaining
to Yahoo accounts and selling them to the public, and offers his services to hijack more accounts
by launching cross-site scripting attacks (XSS). These attacks according to [103] let attackers
steal cookies from Yahoo! Webmail users.
With attacks as easy as interception of cookies and consequences as severe as exposing
an excess of 40 million customers’ financial information, addressing issues of Internet, and
especially session cookies security, is an ever growing necessity. A new direction of research in
[10] suggested devising Lamport’s one-time passwords [38] as a means with which cookies can
be made secure. We described in the previous chapters that this promising solution offers a great
potential and help avoid a lot of security threats seen in today’s Internet. It is well known that the
computational overhead resulting from the need to calculate the hash values of the one-way hash
chain in the first transaction can be high and unmanageable by devices with modest memory and
energy capabilities, and sometimes undesired by even the highly capable devices simply because
we do not want to add burdens on our computers. Having this in mind, we designed five novel
schemes that will aid in lowering this computational overhead while at the same time benefiting
from the excellent security features of one-way hash functions. We have demonstrated with

160

extensive experiments that our solutions achieved better performance that the straightforwardly
configured hash chains.
Another equally important issue that this dissertation has addressed is the context of
multi-server environments where single-sign on mechanisms provide convenience for customers
and cost effectiveness for providers at the potential cost of breached security. Scholars have
pointed out that due to flaws encountered in the logic of common SSO solutions such as XAML
2.0 and OpenID, attackers can possibly launch attacks such as impersonation and cross-scripting
targeting weaknesses that result from the unidirectional nature of the authentication channel
between clients and service providers and the lack of guarantees of recent keys. With these
weaknesses in mind, we have developed a keyless signature scheme that achieves authentication
channel bi-directionality between the client and the service provider and a recent authentication
key by periodically updating authentication credentials.
The last proposed scheme targets the context of toll/traffic management systems that
utilize RFID tags. An authentication scheme employing a modified Merkle hash tree is suggested
to address authentication of RFID tags in this contexts. The Merkle hash tree modification
proposed is aims to achieve scalability and computational economy while not sacrificing strong
authentication.
9.1

Future Work

The work in this dissertation can be extended and improved in a variety of ways. For
example, in the context of the sparse caching solution proposed to avoid session hijacking
attacks, a possible extension can be made by measuring real network traffic and finding accurate
statistics about the number of transactions a typical user session is. This can be achieved by
looking at more specific contexts such as medical settings where physicians and nurses typically
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have a relatively tangible behavior. Another possibility to extend our work in this scheme is
investigate the cost of session re-initialization as it is important to measure such construct to
validate the result obtained.
While our solutions have been targeting cookies in HTTP connections, a possible
extension of the works reported in this dissertation is to compare their performance with the
utilization of SSL based connections throughout user session. However, in order to do that, it is
imperative to implement and evaluate the proposed schemes in real networks before moving to
the next step of comparing their potential benefits relative to SSL based channels.
As far as the SSO authentication scheme, our future work includes comparing the results
obtained in our simulation with other schemes available in the literature. This will require
analyzing and interpreting current SSO authentication schemes and comparing them with the
proposed keyless signature scheme.
Finally, the work in the tree-based toll/traffic RFID management system can be extended
by analyzing behavior in RFID networks and ultimately finding the appropriate setup of the
Merkle hash tree suitable for this environment. This will result in a more scalable scheme; one
that is attractive for developers in this arena.
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